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Abstract
Tomodel discrete-time finite-state uncertain processes, we argue for the use of a global beliefmodel in the form
of an upper expectation that is the most conservative one under a set of basic axioms. Our motivation for these
axioms, which describe how local and global belief models should be related, is based on two possible inter-
pretations for an upper expectation: a behavioural one similar to Walley’s, and an interpretation in terms of
upper envelopes of linear expectations. We show that the most conservative upper expectation satisfying our
axioms, that is, our model of choice, coincides with a particular version of the game-theoretic upper expecta-
tion introduced by Shafer and Vovk. This has two important implications: it guarantees that there is a unique
most conservative global belief model satisfying our axioms; and it shows that Shafer and Vovk’s model can be
given an axiomatic characterisation and thereby provides an alternative motivation for adopting this model,
even outside their game-theoretic framework. Finally, we relate our model to the upper expectation resulting
froma traditionalmeasure-theoretic approach. We show that thismeasure-theoretic upper expectation also sat-
isfies the proposed axioms, which implies that it is dominated by ourmodel or, equivalently, the game-theoretic
model. Moreover, if all local models are precise, all three models coincide.
Keywords: upper expectations, uncertain processes, coherence, game-theoretic probability,
measure-theoretic probability, global uncertainty model
1. Introduction
There are various ways to describe discrete-time uncertain processes, such asMarkov processes, mathemat-
ically. Formany, measure theory is and has been the preferred framework to describe the uncertain dynamics of
such processes [1, 2]. Others have used martingales or a game-theoretic approach [3–5]. However, the common
starting point for all these approaches are the local belief models. They describe the dynamics of the process
fromone time instant to the next and they are typically learned frommeasurements or elicited from experts. For
instance, in some specific cases, one typicallymay have information about ‘the probability of throwing heads on
the next coin toss’, ‘the expected number of goods that are sold by a certain shop on a single day’, ‘the probability
of rain tomorrow’, ... In ameasure-theoretic context, such local belief models are presented in the form of prob-
ability charges or probability measures on the local state space; in a game-theoretic context, sets of allowable
bets are used. The latter belong to a family of so-called imprecise probabilitymodels [6–8], e.g. upper and lower
previsions (or expectations), sets of desirable gambles, credal sets... Such imprecise probability models gener-
alise traditional precise models, in the sense that they allow for indecision and for a representation that only
expresses partial knowledge about the probabilities. In order to allow for imprecision in a measure-theoretic
context, we will often consider sets of probability measures (or charges) on the local state space. Then, if local
state-spaces are assumed to be finite, as in our case, the game-theoretic and measure-theoretic local descrip-
tions are mathematically equivalent. This will be clarified in Sections 2 and 3.
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In practice however, we are typically interested in more general inferences such as ‘the (lower and upper)
expected number of tosses until the first tails is thrown’, ‘the (lower and upper) probability of being out of stock
on a given day’, ... It is less straightforward how we should directly learn about such more complicated infer-
ences and, even if we could in principle do so, it is often not possible or feasible to gather sufficient information
because of time and budget limitations. Hence, the question arises: ‘How and to which extent, can we extend
the information captured in the local models towards global information about the entire process?’.
Measure theory relies on countable additivity to do this elegantly, and this results in amathematically power-
ful, but rather abstract framework. The mathematical arguments are often encumbered by measurability con-
straints, and it is not always clearhow toextendclassicalmeasure-theoretic notions to an impreciseprobabilities
setting. On the other hand, Shafer and Vovk’s game-theoretic framework defines global upper expectations con-
structively using the concept of a ‘supermartingale’. Though it allows us to directly model imprecision and does
not require measurability constraints, the involved upper expectations thus far lack a characterisation in terms
of mathematical properties. This impacts the generality of their model in the negative, since it can therefore
only bemotivated from a game-theoretic point of view.
We propose a different, third approach. Our aim is to establish a global belief model, in the form of a con-
ditional upper expectation, that extends the information contained in the local models by using a number of
mathematical properties. Notably, this model will not be bound to a single interpretation. Indeed, its character-
isingproperties canbe justified starting fromanumber of different interpretations. We consider anddiscuss two
of the most significant ones in Section 4; a behavioural interpretation that is more in line with a game-theoretic
approach to uncertainty, and an interpretation in terms of upper envelopes of linear expectation operators. We
then define the desired globalmodel as themost conservative—the uniquemodel that does not contain any ad-
ditional information—under this particular set of properties. In other words, it is the so-called natural extension
[6, 8] under this set of properties.
In Section 5, we give an alternative characterisation of this most conservative model by showing that it is
the unique operator that satisfies a specific set of properties. This alternative characterisation is particularly
interesting from a technical point of view, since it allows us to establish our main result in Section 6: that our
model coincideswith a version of the game-theoretic upper expectation introducedbyShafer andVovk [3, 4]. On
the one hand, this serves as an additionalmotivation for ourmodel. On the other hand, it establishes a concrete
axiomatisation for the game-theoretic upper expectation. Section 8 aims at strengthening the relevance of the
most conservative model that results from our axioms by listing its most salient properties.
In the final section, we couch our findings in a more measure-theoretic language. As a first step, we put
forward a sensible way of applying measure theory in our imprecise probabilities setting. To do this, we draw
inspiration from earlier work done in our group [9]. Subsequently, we show that the measure-theoretic upper
expectation this results in, satisfies the axioms presented in Section 4 and is therefore always dominated by
the most conservative one satisying these axioms—which is our model. Moreover, the fact that this model, en-
tirely based on measure-theoretic principles, also satisfies our proposed axioms, is to be seen as an additional
motivation to adopt them. Furthermore, in a context where all local models are precise, meaning that every
single one of them can be represented by a single probabilitymass function on the local state space, both upper
expectations—and hence, also the game-theoretic one—turn out to be one and the samemodel.
As a final remark, we want to mention that our current work extends upon an earlier conference contribu-
tion [10]. The added material is mainly gathered in the final section; it concerns the study of how our model is
related to a possible measure-theoretic model. Apart from that, another important difference with the confer-
ence contribution lies in how local models are extended in order to become consistent with the game-theoretic
approach; see the first part of Section 6 and compare this with [10, Section 2].
2. Upper Expectations
We denote the set of all natural numbers, without 0, by N, and let N0 := N ∪ {0}. The set of extended real
numbers is denoted by R := R∪ {+∞,−∞} and is endowed with the usual order and the usual order topology
(corresponding to the two-point compactification ofR). The set of positive real numbers is denoted byR>0 and
the set of non-negative real numbers byR≥0. We also adopt the usual conventions for the addition between the
reals and +∞ and −∞, and the conventions that +∞−∞=−∞+∞=+∞ and 0 · (+∞) = 0 · (−∞) = 0.
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Informally, we consider a subject who is uncertain about the value that some variable Y assumes in a non-
empty set Y . More formally, we call any map on Y a variable ; our informal Y is a special case: it corresponds
to the identity map onY . A subject’s uncertainty about the unknown value of Y can then be represented by an
upper expectation E: an extended real-valued map defined on some subset D of the set L (Y ) of all extended
real-valued variables on Y . An element f ofL (Y ) is simply called an extended real variable. We say that f is
bounded below if there is some real c such that f (y )≥ c for all y ∈Y , and we say that f is bounded above if− f
is bounded below. We call a sequence { fn}n∈N0 of extended real variables uniformly bounded below if there is a
real c such that fn (y ) ≥ c for all n ∈ N0 and y ∈ Y . An important role will be reserved for elements f ofL (Y )
that are bounded, meaning that they are bounded above and below. Bounded real-valued variables on Y are
called gambles on Y , and we useL (Y ) to denote the set of all of them. The set of all bounded below elements
ofL (Y ) is denoted byL b(Y ).
Consider now the special case that E is defined on at least the set of all bounded real-valued variables; so
L (Y )⊆D . Then we call E boundedly coherent [6–8] if it satisfies the following three coherence axioms:
C1. E( f )≤ sup f for all f ∈L (Y ); [upper bound]
C2. E( f + g )≤ E( f ) +E(g ) for all f ,g ∈L (Y ); [sub-additivity]
C3. E(λ f ) = λE( f ) for all λ ∈R≥0 and f ∈L (Y ). [non-negative homogeneity]
In the particular case where D = L (Y ), we will simply say that E is coherent. For any (boundedly) coherent
E, if we let E be the conjugate lower expectation defined by E( f ) := −E(− f ) for all f ∈ −D , then the following
additional properties follow from C1–C3:
C4. f ≤ g ⇒ E( f )≤ E(g ) for all f ,g ∈L (Y ); [monotonicity]
C5. inf f ≤ E( f )≤ E( f )≤ sup f for all f ∈L (Y ); [bounds]
C6. E( f +µ) = E( f ) +µ for all µ ∈R and all f ∈L (Y ); [constant additivity]
C7. for any f ∈L (Y ) and any sequence { fn}n∈N0 inL (Y ): [uniform continuity]
lim
n→+∞
sup | f − fn |= 0 ⇒ lim
n→+∞
E( fn ) = E( f ).
Proof. Weonly proveC5, which clearly implies that E is real-valued onL (Y ), and the remaining properties then
follow from the standard argumentation in [6, Section 2.6.1.].
First, note that E(0) = 0 because of C3 and our convention that 0 · (+∞) = 0 · (−∞) = 0. Therefore, for all
f ∈ L (Y ), it follows from C2 that 0 ≤ E( f ) + E(− f ), or equivalently, that −E(− f ) ≤ E( f ). Applying C1 to both
sides, we find that inf f =−sup(− f )≤−E(− f )≤ E( f )≤ sup f . The result now follows readily from the definition
of E.
A gamble f is typically interpreted as an uncertain reward or gain that depends on the value that Y takes in
Y ; if Y takes the value y , the (possibly negative) gain is f (y ). Then, according toWalley’s behavioural interpret-
ation [6], the upper expectation E( f )of a gamble f is a subject’s infimumselling price for the gamble f , implying
that, for any α > E( f ), the subject is willing to accept the gamble α− f .2 Axioms C1–C3 are then called ration-
ality axioms, since they ensure that these selling prices are chosen rationally. Alternatively, any coherent upper
expectation onL (Y ) can equivalently be represented by a set of linear expectations onL (Y ): coherent upper
expectations on L (Y ) that are self-conjugate, meaning that E( f ) = −E(− f ) for all f ∈ L (Y ). More precisely,
it follows from [6, Section 3.3.3] that any coherent upper expectation E on L (Y ) is the upper envelope of the
set of all linear expectations on L (Y ) that are dominated by E; so E( f ) = sup

E( f ) : (∀g ∈ L (Y ))E(g ) ≤ E(g )
	
,
2Strictly speaking, the interpretation as infimumselling price only guarantees that there areα> E ( f )arbitrarily close toE ( f ) forwhich our
subject accepts α− f (by definition of the infimum). Our claim that this is true for all α> E ( f ) is based on an additional implicit assumption
that if a subject is willing to sell a gamble for some price, then she is also willing to sell that gamble for any higher price.
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where E ranges over the linear expectations onL (Y ). Moreover, according to [8, Theorem 8.15], linear expect-
ations onL (Y ) are in a one-to-one relation with probability charges on the power setP (Y ) of Y , being maps
p :P (Y )→ R≥0 that are finitely additive and where p (Y ) = 1 and p (;) = 0. Such probability charges are more
general than the more conventional probability measures, which additionally require σ-additivity and typic-
ally also that the domain should be restricted to a σ-algebra on Y . However, when Y is finite, this distinction
disappears, and we can simply limit ourselves to working with probability mass functions on Y ; these can be
seen as probability charges or measures restricted to the domain of all singletons. In that case, we have that
E( f ) =
∑
y ∈Y f (y )p (y ) for any linear expectation E on L (Y ) and any f ∈ L (Y ), where p is the unique prob-
ability mass functions on Y defined by p (y ) := E(1y ) for all y ∈ Y . Here, we used 1A to denote the indicator
of A ⊆ Y : the gamble on Y assuming the value 1 on A and 0 elsewhere, and where we will not distinguish in
notation between y and {y }. Hence, ifY is finite, any coherent upper expectation E onL (Y ) can alternatively
be represented by the corresponding set of probabilitymass functions
PE :=
¦
p ∈ P :
 
∀ f ∈L (Y )
∑
y ∈Y
f (y )p (y )≤ E( f )
©
, (1)
where P denotes the set of all probability mass functions onY . It then follows from [6, Section 3.3.3], that
E( f ) = sup
§∑
y ∈Y
f (y )p (y ) : p ∈ PE
ª
for all f ∈L (Y ). (2)
This alternative representation of a coherent upper expectation will be our starting point in Section 9, where we
aim to establish a measure-theoretic global belief model in the form of an upper expectation.
It follows from the discussion above that, in general, (boundedly coherent) upper expectations can be inter-
preted in at least two possible ways: in a direct behavioural manner in terms of selling prices for gambles, or
as a supremum over—an upper envelope of—a set of linear expectations. As will be discussed in Section 6, the
behavioural interpretation allowsus tomotivate the game-theoretic approach proposed by Shafer and Vovk. On
the other hand, an interpretation in terms of upper envelopes of linear expectations seems more natural from
a measure-theoretic point of view, where probability measures or mass functions are regarded as the primary
objects for describing uncertainty. Linear expectations are then typically obtained by integration and limiting
the domain to measurable functions. In this paper, we will not allow ourselves to be bound to any of these two
interpretations. Instead, we will motivate the defining properties of our proposed global belief model in terms
of either of these interpretations.
3. Upper Expectations in Discrete-Time Uncertain Processes
Weconsider adiscrete-time uncertain process : a sequence X1,X2, ...,Xn , ... of uncertain states, where the state
Xk at each discrete time k ∈ N takes values in a fixed non-empty setX , called the state space. We will assume
that this state spaceX is finite. Let a situation x1:n be any string (x1, ..., xn ) ∈X 1:n :=X
n of possible state values
with finite length n ∈N0. In particular, the unique empty string x1:0, denoted by , is called the initial situation:
X 1:0 := {}. We denote the set of all situations byX ∗ := ∪n∈N0X1:n . We will also use the generic notations s and
t to denote situations. Furthermore, when we write x1:n ∈X
∗, we implicitly assume that n ∈N0.
To model our uncertainty about the dynamics of an uncertain process, we associate, with every situation
x1:n ∈ X
∗, a coherent upper expectation Qx1:n on L (X ). This upper expectation expresses a subject’s beliefs
about the uncertain value of the next state Xn+1, when she has observed that X1 = x1,X2 = x2, · · · ,Xn−1 = xn−1
and Xn = xn . Hence, it gives information about how the process changes from one time instant to the next.
We will therefore also refer to Qx1:n as the local model or the local upper expectation associated with x1:n . We
gather all local models in an imprecise probability tree : a function Q• that maps any situation s ∈ X
∗ to its
corresponding coherent upper expectationQs . Hence, such an imprecise probability tree Q•, which wewill also
simply denote by Q, represents the dynamics of the uncertain process as a whole.
As discussed in the previous section, we consider two possible ways of interpreting the coherent upper ex-
pectations Qs : in terms of upper envelopes of linear expectations and in terms of betting behaviour. The latter
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is, by nature, more oriented towards a game-theoretic approach, whereas the interpretation in terms of upper
envelopes of linear expectations will seem more natural for a reader with a measure-theoretic background. In
fact, since X is assumed to be finite, the coherent upper expectation Qs , for any s ∈ X
∗, can be represented
equivalently by the set Ps := PQs of probability mass functions on X , related to it by Equations (1) and (2). In
measure-theoretic contexts, this representation in terms of Ps is then typically preferred over the representation
in terms of Qs .
Themathematical equivalencebetween thedifferent approaches—thegame-theoretic, themeasure-theoretic
and ours—on a local level is crucial, because only then, we can meaningfully compare the differences of their
associated uncertainty models on a global level. Indeed, though it is locally only a matter of interpretational
differences, it is not immediately clear how these different approaches relate on a global level, where we look at
the entire dynamics of the process and no longer only at the transition from one time instant to the next. Each
approachwill extend the localmodels using different concepts, assumptions andmethods, resulting in possibly
different global models. Our upper expectation approach will use a limited set of simple properties, that, as we
will argue, are desirable for a global model to have, under both of the interpretations we consider. Before we
proceed to do so, we finish this section by introducing some further notation about uncertain processes.
An infinite sequence x1x2x3 · · · of state values is called a path, which we denote byω := x1x2x3 · · ·. We gather
all paths in the sample space Ω :=X N. For any pathω := x1x2 · · · ∈Ω, the situation x1:n := x1x2 · · ·xn that consists
of its first n state values is denoted byωn ∈ X1:n . The state value xn at time n is denoted byωn ∈ X . An event
A ⊆Ω is a collection of paths, and in particular, the cylinder event Γ (x1:n ) := {ω ∈Ω :ω
n = x1:n } of some situation
x1:n ∈X
∗, is the set of all pathsω ∈Ω that ‘go through’ the situation x1:n .
A variable on Ω is called a global variable and we gather all extended real(-valued) global variables in the
set V :=L (Ω). Similarly, we let Vb :=L b(Ω) and V :=L (Ω). For any natural k ≤ ℓ, we denote by Xk :ℓ the global
variable defined by Xk :ℓ(ω) := (ωk , ...,ωℓ) for allω∈Ω. As such, the state Xk := Xk :k at time k can also be regarded
as a global variable. Moreover, for any natural k ≤ ℓ and any map f :X ℓ−k+1→R, we will write f (Xk :ℓ) to denote
the global extended real variable defined by f (Xk :ℓ) := f ◦ Xk :ℓ . We call a global extended real variable f n-
measurable for some n ∈N0, if it only depends on the initial n state values; so f (ω1) = f (ω2) for any two paths
ω1 and ω2 such that ω
n
1 = ω
n
2 . We will then use the notation f (x1:n ) for its constant value f (ω) on all paths
ω ∈ Γ (x1:n ). Clearly, the indicator Ix1:n := 1Γ (x1:n ) of the cylinder event Γ (x1:n ) for x1:n ∈ X
∗ is an n-measurable
variable. Finally, we call any f ∈V finitary if it is n-measurable for some n ∈ N0. We gather all finitary gambles
inVfin.
4. In Search of a Global Belief Model
Any extended real-valued map E :V×X ∗→R: ( f , s ) 7→ E( f |s ) will be called a global upper expectation. The
corresponding global lower expectation E: V×X ∗ → R: ( f , s ) 7→ E( f |s ) is then defined by conjugacy: E( f |s ) :=
−E(− f |s ) for all f ∈ V and all s ∈ X ∗. These lower and upper expectations also give rise to upper and lower
probabilities. In particular, for any event A ⊆ Ω and any s ∈ X ∗, P(A|s ) := E(1A |s ) is the upper probability of
A conditional on s and, similarly, P(A|s ) := E(1A |s ) is the lower probability of A conditional on s . Throughout
this work, however, we will focus almost entirely on (global) upper expectations, and will regard (global) lower
expectations and upper and lower probabilities as derived notions.
Givenan impreciseprobability treeQ that associates a local upper expectationQs withevery situation s ∈X
∗,
we aim to define a global upper expectation E that extends the information included in these local models in a
‘rational’ manner. To do so, we impose the following properties, where we adopt the notation that E( f |X1:n ) :=
E( f |·) ◦X1:n for all f ∈V and all n ∈N0, and where limits of variables are intended to be taken pointwise.
P1. E( f (Xn+1)|x1:n ) =Qx1:n ( f ) for all f ∈L (X ) and all x1:n ∈X
∗.
P2. E( f |s ) = E( f Is |s ) for all f ∈Vfin and all s ∈X
∗.
P3. E( f |X1:n )≤ E(E( f |X1:n+1)|X1:n ) for all f ∈Vfin and all n ∈N0.
P4. f ≤ g ⇒ E( f |s )≤ E(g |s ) for all f ,g ∈V and all s ∈X ∗.
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P5. For any sequence { fn}n∈N0 of finitary gambles that is uniformly bounded below and any s ∈X
∗:
lim
n→+∞
fn = f ⇒ limsup
n→+∞
E( fn |s )≥ E( f |s ).
To motivate P1–P5, we need to attach some interpretation to E. We will consider two particular ones, similar to
what we have done for the (boundedly) coherent upper expectations in Section 2.
We start from the interpretation of a global gamble f ∈V as an uncertain reward depending on the uncertain
pathω that the uncertain process takes inΩ. However, it is not clearwhat thismeans operationally if the gamble
f depends on the entire length of the path. Indeed, the gamble f depends on an infinite number of subsequent
state values, so there is no point in time when we can determine the actual reward linked to the gamble f . The
same interpretational problem arises when considering unbounded or extended real variables (on a general set
Y such as Ω). The simple interpretation of an uncertain reward does not suffice there because the reward it-
self can be unbounded or infinite, which is unrealistic—or even meaningless—in operational practice. For this
reason, we prefer to only attach a direct operational meaning to the value E( f |s ) of a global upper expectation
E for a finitary gamble f ∈ Vfin conditional on a situation s ∈ X
∗. Such finitary gambles can be given an oper-
ationally meaningful behavioural interpretation as uncertain rewards because they take real values3 and only
depend on the state at a finite number of time instances.
Wedistinguish the following twoways for interpreting theglobal upper expectationE( f |s )of afinitarygamble
f ∈Vfin conditional on a situation s ∈X
∗:
• Behavioural interpretation. It is a subject’s infimum selling price for f contingent on the event Γ (s ), implying
that,4 for any α> E( f |s ), she is willing to accept the uncertain reward associated with the gamble Is (α− f ).
• Interpretation as an upper envelope. It is the supremum value of E( f |s ), where E belongs to some given setE
of conditional linear expectation operators: E( f |s ) = sup{E( f |s ) : E ∈E}.
Since P1–P3 only apply to finitary gambles, a direct justification for these axioms can be given quite easily in
each of the above interpretations. Property P1 requires that the global model E should be compatible with the
local models Qs . The desirability of this property is self-evident, no matter which interpretation is used. Prop-
erty P2 requires that the upper expectation of a finitary gamble f conditional on s should only depend on the
value of f on the paths ω ∈ Γ (s ). This property is clearly desirable when using the behavioural interpretation,
because Is (α− f )only depends on the restriction of f to Γ (s ). It is also quite evident that this property is desirable
for an upper envelope of conditional linear expectations, because P2 should in particular also hold for such con-
ditional linear expectations themselves. Similarly, that P3 should hold under the upper envelope interpretation,
is motivated by the fact that conditional linear expectations satisfy P3 with equality—then better known as the
law of iterated expectations; an upper envelope of conditional expectations is therefore guaranteed to satisfy
P3, under the assumption that P4 holds for conditional linear expectations. In order to see that property P3 is
also desirable according to the behavioural interpretation, one requires a conditional version of the notion of
coherence that we discussed in Section 2 [6, 8, 11].5 Explaining inmore detail why this is the case, and what this
conditional notion of coherence exactly entails, would however lead us too far.
Having attached an interpretation to finitary gambles and their conditional upper expectations, we now pro-
ceed to do the same formore general variables. We have already argued that no direct operational meaning can
be given to such variables. However, this should not be taken to imply that an uncertainty model should not be
able to deal with them. In fact, they can serve as useful abstract idealisations of (sequences of) variables that can
be given a direct operational meaning. In particular, wewill regard any extended real variable f that is bounded
3One could also question the meaning of a direct behavioural interpretation for some specific (real-valued) gambles. For instance, how
doweexchangemoney if the gamble’s value is equal toπ? In this case,we canonly give an indirect interpretation in terms of simpler gambles
that are ‘sufficiently’ close.
4The comment in Footnote 2, applies here as well, suitable adapted to the conditional setting.
5There are several versions of conditional coherence [6, 8, 11], however, in the case where variables take values in a finite set, all these
different versions are mathematically equivalent.
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below and that can be written as the pointwise limit limn→+∞ fn of some sequence of finitary gambles { fn}n∈N0 ,
as an abstract idealisation of fn for large n . We gather these limits in the set
Vb,lim :=
§
f ∈Vb : f = lim
n→+∞
fn for some sequence { fn}n∈N0 inVfin
ª
.
Since P5 applies to precisely these kinds of variables, this axiom can be justified by extending the above ideal-
isation from the variables f to their upper expectations E( f |s ). Basically, since f is an abstract idealisation of fn
for large n , E( f |s ) should be an abstract idealisation of E( fn |s ) for large n . The practical benefit of this is that we
can then use E( f |s ) to reason about E( fn |s ) for a generic large value of n , without having to specify the specific
value of n . The problem, however, is that the sequence

E( fn |s )
	
n∈N0
may not converge. What we then do know
for sure, however, is that as n approaches infinity, E( fn |s )will oscillate between the limit superior and inferior of
the sequence

E( fn |s )
	
n∈N0
. Since wewant E( f |s ) to serve as an idealisation of E( fn |s ) for generic large values of
n , E( f |s ) should therefore definitely not exceed the limit superior, as this would result in an unwarranted loss of
‘information’, in the sense that E( f |s ) would be too high—this will be clarified shortly. We therefore impose P5.
The final property that we impose is P4, which states that E should be monotone. For finitary gambles f
and g , this follows easily from either of our two different interpretations for E( f |s ) and E(g |s ). Under a beha-
vioural interpretation, since the reward associated with g is guaranteed to be at least as high as that of f , the
same should be true for a subject’s infimum selling prices for these two gambles. Under an interpretation in
terms of upper envelopes of expectations, monotonicity of the envelope is implied by the monotonicity of each
of the individual expectations. If f and g are more general variables—so not necessarily finitary gambles—the
motivation for P4 is that, still, higher rewards—even if abstract and idealized—should correspond to higher up-
per expectations. It is also worth noting that the combination of P4 and P5 implies that E is continuous with
respect to non-decreasing sequences of finitary gambles. In ameasure-theoretic context, this kind of continuity
is usually obtained as a consequence of the assumption of σ-additivity [1, 12].
We will show in Section 6 that P1–P5 are consistent, in the sense that if the local models Qs are coherent,
there always is at least one global upper expectation E satisfying P1–P5. However, there may be more than one
global upper expectation E satisfying P1–P5. In that case, the best thing to do, we believe, is to choose the most
conservativemodel among those that satisfyP1–P5, as choosing anyotherwouldmeanadding ‘information’ that
is not simply implied by our axioms. We will denote this most conservative global upper expectation by EA and
let EA be its conjugate lower expectation. As we will see in Section 6, EA is guaranteed to exist, and furthermore
coincides with a particular version of the game-theoretic upper expectation defined by Shafer and Vovk [3, 13].
Of course, in order for our definition of EA to make sense, we need to know what it means for an upper ex-
pectation E ′ to be more conservative than some other upper expectation E. We here take this to mean that E ′
is higher than E. So higher upper expectations are more conservative, or less informative. This is why, in our
motivation for P5, we said that a too high E( f |s ) corresponds to an unwarranted loss of ‘information’. That it
is indeed reasonable to regard higher expectations as more conservative, can again be motivated using either
of the two interpretations that we considered before. Under the behavioural interpretation, higher upper ex-
pectations mean higher selling prices, which is clearly more conservative. Using an interpretation in terms of
upper envelopes of expectations, higher upper expectations correspond to larger sets of expectations, so weaker
constraints on expectations, which is again less informative and hence more conservative.
Having said all this, wewould like to stress that—despite our extensive use of them tomotivate our axioms—
none of the results that we are about to develop hinge on any particular interpretation for upper expectations.
Other interpretations could also be adopted, or perhaps even no interpretation at all. All that is needed is that
we agree on P1–P5 and on the fact that higher upper expectations are more conservative.
5. An Axiomatisation of E A
For a given imprecise probability tree Q, letE1−2(Q) denote the set of all global upper expectations satisfying
P1–P2, and similarly forE1−4(Q) andE1−5(Q). In this section,we introduce sufficient conditions for a global upper
expectation E to be the most conservative among all upper expectations inE1−5(Q). We start by considering the
domain of finitary gambles and then, step by step, extend the domain and introduce additional conditions on
E, in such a way that it becomes the most conservative on this extended domain.
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For any situation x1:n ∈ X
∗ and any (n + 1)-measurable (global) gamble f , we use f (x1:n ·) to denote the
gamble on X that assumes the value f (x1:n+1) in xn+1 ∈ X , and then use f (x1:nXn+1) as a shorthand for the
global gamble f (x1:n ·)◦Xn+1. The following lemma establishes compatibility with the local models in a stronger
way than P1 does.
Lemma 1. Consider any E ∈E1−2(Q). Then, for any situation x1:n ∈X
∗ and any (n + 1)-measurable gamble f ,
E( f |x1:n ) =Qx1:n ( f (x1:n ·)).
Proof. Fix any x1:n ∈ X
∗ and any (n + 1)-measurable gamble f . Note that f (x1:nXn+1)Ix1:n = f Ix1:n and hence,
because of P2, E( f |x1:n ) = E( f Ix1:n |x1:n ) = E( f (x1:nXn+1)Ix1:n |x1:n ) = E( f (x1:nXn+1)|x1:n ). P1 therefore implies that,
indeed, E( f |x1:n ) =Qx1:n ( f (x1:n ·)).
To make sure that some particular upper expectation E ∈ E1−4(Q) is a most conservative upper expectation on
the domain of all finitary gambles, we impose on it the following property, known as the law of iterated upper
expectations [3, 14]:
P3=. E( f |X1:n ) = E(E( f |X1:n+1)|X1:n ) for all f ∈Vfin and all n ∈N0.
Proposition 2. Consider any E ∈E1−4(Q) that satisfies P3=. Then, for any E ′ ∈E1−4(Q), we have that
E( f |s )≥ E ′( f |s ) for all f ∈Vfin and all s ∈X
∗.
Proof. For any p ∈N0 and any (p+1)-measurable gamble g , we let QX1:p (g ) be the p -measurable gamble defined
byQX1:p (g )(ω) :=Qωp (g (ω
p ·)) for allω ∈Ω. Note thatQX1:p (g ) is indeedagamblebecauseof (bounded) coherence
[C5] and the fact that g is a gamble. Then, because both the operators E and E ′ satisfy P1 and P2, it follows from
Lemma 1 that
E ′(g |X1:p ) =QX1:p (g ) = E(g |X1:p ). (3)
Now fix any f ∈Vfin and any x1:m ∈X
∗. Since f is finitary, it is n-measurable for some n ∈N0. We can assume
thatm+2< n without loss of generality, because f is obviously alsop -measurable for everyp ≥ n . Now, it follows
fromEquation (3) and the fact that QX1:n−1 ( f ) is an (n−1)-measurable gamble, that E
′( f |X1:n−1) = E( f |X1:n−1) is an
(n−1)-measurable gamble. Subsequently, we canapply Equation (3) oncemore, where E ′( f |X1:n−1) = E( f |X1:n−1)
now takes the role of g , in order to find that E ′(E ′( f |X1:n−1)|X1:n−2) = E(E( f |X1:n−1)|X1:n−2) is an (n−2)-measurable
gamble. Then we can continue in the same way, to finally obtain that
E ′(E ′(· · ·E ′( f |X1:n−1) · · · |X1:m+1)|x1:m ) = E(E(· · ·E( f |X1:n−1) · · · |X1:m+1)|x1:m ).
By repeatedly applyingP3 andP4,we infer that E′(E ′(· · ·E ′( f |X1:n−1) · · · |X1:m+1)|x1:m )≥ · · · ≥ E ′(E ′( f |X1:m+1)|x1:m )≥
E ′( f |x1:m ). Hence, plugging this back into the previous expression, we have that
E ′( f |x1:m )≤ E(E(· · ·E( f |X1:n−1) · · · |X1:m+1)|x1:m ).
On theotherhand, sinceE satisfiesP3=, we infer that E(E(· · ·E( f |X1:n−1) · · · |X1:m+1)|x1:m ) = · · ·= E(E( f |X1:m+1)|x1:m )
= E( f |x1:m ). So indeed, we find that E ′( f |x1:m )≤ E( f |x1:m ).
Next, we consider the domain Vb,lim ⊂ V of all extended real variables that are bounded below and that can be
writtenas thepointwise limit of a sequenceoffinitarygambles. The following condition, togetherwithP3=, turns
out to be sufficient for an upper expectation E to be a most conservative one on the domain of Vb,lim amongst
all upper expectations in E1−5(Q).
P6. For any f ∈ Vb,lim and any s ∈ X
∗, there is some sequence { fn}n∈N0 of n-measurable gambles that is uni-
formly bounded below and that converges pointwise to f , such thatmoreover limsupn→+∞E( fn |s )≤ E( f |s ).
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Note that, for an upper expectation E ∈ E1−5(Q), the inequality limsupn→+∞E( fn |s ) ≤ E( f |s ) in P6 is in fact an
equality because of P5.
Proposition 3. Consider any E ∈E1−5(Q) that satisfies P3
= and P6. Then, for all E ′ ∈E1−5(Q), we have that
E( f |s )≥ E ′( f |s ) for all f ∈Vb,lim and all s ∈X
∗.
Proof. Fix any f ∈Vb,lim, any s ∈ X ∗ and any E ′ ∈ E1−5(Q). According to P6, there is some sequence { fn}n∈N0 of
n-measurable gambles that is uniformly bounded below and that converges pointwise to f in such a way that
limsupn→+∞E( fn |s )≤ E( f |s ) and therefore, due to P5, also that
limsup
n→+∞
E( fn |s ) = E( f |s ). (4)
Because all fn are finitary gambles and both E and E
′ are upper expectations in E1−4(Q), with E additionally
satisfying P3=, we can apply Proposition 2 to find that
limsup
n→+∞
E ′( fn |s )≤ limsup
n→+∞
E( fn |s ). (5)
Furthermore, since { fn}n∈N0 is a sequence of finitary gambles that is uniformly bounded below and that con-
verges pointwise to f , P5 implies that E ′( f |s )≤ limsupn→+∞E
′( fn |s ). Combining this with Equations (4) and (5),
we find that, indeed, E ′( f |s )≤ E( f |s ).
Finally, we consider the entire domainV. Now, in order for an upper expectation onV to be the most conservat-
ive one, it suffices to additionally impose the following property, as we will show presently.
P7. For any f ∈V and any s ∈X ∗,
E( f |s ) = inf
¦
E(g |s ) : g ∈Vb,lim and g ≥ f
©
.
Theorem 4. Consider any E ∈E1−5(Q) that satisfies P3
=, P6 and P7. Then, for all E ′ ∈E1−5(Q), we have that
E( f |s )≥ E ′( f |s ) for all f ∈V and all s ∈X ∗.
Proof. Fix any f ∈V, any s ∈X ∗ and any E ′ ∈E1−5(Q). According to P7, we have that
E( f |s ) = inf
¦
E(g |s ) : g ∈Vb,lim and g ≥ f
©
.
Then, using Proposition 3, we get
inf
¦
E ′(g |s ) : g ∈Vb,lim and g ≥ f
©
≤ inf
¦
E(g |s ) : g ∈Vb,lim and g ≥ f
©
= E( f |s ).
Since, for any g ∈Vb,lim such that f ≤ g , we have that E
′( f |s )≤ E ′(g |s ) because E ′ satisfies P4, it follows that
E ′( f |s )≤ inf
¦
E ′(g |s ) : g ∈Vb,lim and g ≥ f
©
≤ E( f |s ),
which completes the proof.
We conclude that, according to Theorem 4, if there is some upper expectation E ∈ E1−5(Q) that satisfies P3
=,
P6 and P7, it must be the unique most conservative upper expectation in E1−5(Q), and it must therefore be the
global beliefmodel EA thatwe are after. So it nowonly remains to show that there is at least one—thennecessarily
unique—global upper expectation in E1−5(Q) that additionally satisfies P3=, P6 and P7.
6. Game-Theoretic Upper Expectations
In this section, we show that a particular version of the game-theoretic upper expectation developed by
Shafer and Vovk [3, 4] belongs to E1−5(Q) and furthermore satisfies P3
=, P6 and P7, which will then—because
of Theorem 4—imply the existence of the unique EAwe are in pursuit of. This game-theoretic upper expectation
relies on the concept of a supermartingale,6 which is a capital process—the evolution of a subject’s capital—that
6Shafer and Vovk drew inspiration from Jean Ville, whosework [15] constitutes the first major steps towards a theory of probability where
(super)martingales, instead of probability measures, function as the fundamental, primary objects.
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is obtained by betting against a ‘forecasting system’. The forecasting system—called ‘Forecaster’ in Shafer and
Vovk’s framework—determines for each situation a collection of allowable bets that a subject—called ‘Skeptic’
in Shafer and Vovk’s framework—can choose from. These allowable bets define Forecaster’s uncertainty model
and are also captured by our notion of an imprecise probability tree. In general however, Shafer and Vovk allow
for more general settings where local models need not be boundedly coherent and state spaces can be infinite,
so our discussion here will in that respect be more particular and limited.
As before, we start from an imprecise probability tree that specifies a local coherent upper expectationQs on
L (X ) for every situation s ∈X ∗. However, in their most recent work [4, Part II], Shafer and Vovk start from local
models Es that are defined on the extended domainL (X ) of all extended real local variables, and they require
these local models Es to satisfy a modified version of the bounded coherence axioms C1–C3, generalised to ex-
tended real variables. Concretely, for any s ∈X ∗, they impose the following properties on the upper expectation
Es onL (X ) that models the corresponding local beliefs:
E1. Es (c ) = c for all c ∈R;
E2. Es ( f + g )≤ Es ( f ) +Es (g ) for all f ,g ∈L (X );
E3. Es (λ f ) =λEs ( f ) for all λ ∈R>0 and all f ∈L (X );
E4. f ≤ g ⇒ Es ( f )≤ Es (g ) for all f ,g ∈L (X ).
E5. limn→+∞Es ( fn ) = Es
 
limn→+∞ fn

for any non-decreasing and non-negative sequence { fn}n∈N0 inL (X ).
Hence, in order to place ourselves squarely in their framework, weneed to extend thedomainof our localmodels
Qs from L (X ) to L (X ) in such a way that they satisfy E1–E5. For any f ∈ L (X ) and any c ∈ R, let f
∧c and
f ∨c be the variables in L (X ) respectively defined by f ∧c (x ) :=min{ f (x ), c } and f ∨c (x ) :=max{ f (x ), c } for all
x ∈X . We propose the following two continuity properties for an upper expectation Q↑
s
onL (X ) that extends
a coherent upper expectation Qs onL (X ):
C8. Q↑
s
( f ) = limc→+∞Q
↑
s
( f ∧c ) for all f ∈L b(X );
C9. Q↑
s
( f ) = limc→−∞Q
↑
s
( f ∨c ) for all f ∈L (X );
Properties C8 and C9 are respectively called continuity with respect to upper and lower cuts (or, alternatively,
bounded above and below support). According to [16, Proposition 10 (ii)–(iii)] such an extension Q↑
s
always
exists and is moreover unique. The upper expectation Q↑
s
is also an appropriate extension, in the sense that it
satisfies E1–E5; this follows from [16, Proposition 10] togetherwith [16, Proposition 1].7 Hence, in order to adhere
to Shafer and Vovk’s approach, we can—and will—adopt this particular extension Q ↑
s
of Qs for each situation
s ∈X ∗ in the following game-theoretic reasoning.
A mapM :X ∗ → R is called a supermartingale if it satisfies Q ↑
s
(M (s ·))≤M (s ) for all s ∈ X ∗, whereM (s ·)
denotes the variable inL (X ) that assumes the valueM (s x ) for all x ∈X . As mentioned earlier, a supermartin-
galeM can be interpreted as a capital process that results from betting against a forecasting system. In order
for this tomake sense, such an interpretation will only be attached to supermartingales that are bounded below,
meaning that there is some real c such thatM (s ) ≥ c for all s ∈X ∗. This represents the constraint that we can
never borrow an infinite or even unbounded amount of money. To see that a bounded below supermartingale
M can indeed be interpreted as described above, we first need to know how a forecasting system allows us to
play. In our case, the allowable bets in any given situation s ∈ X ∗ are those variables f ∈ L b(X ) for which
Q↑
s
( f ) ≤ 0—we will come back to this shortly. Now, ifM (s ) is real, then the condition that Q↑
s
(M (s ·)) ≤ M (s )
is equivalent to the condition that Q↑
s
(M (s ·)−M (s ))≤ 0 because Q↑
s
satisfies constant additivity on the domain
L b(X ); see [16, Proposition 3(E8)]. Hence, the incremental changeM (s ·)−M (s )of the capital processM in the
situation s indeed represents an allowable bet. If on the other handM (s ) = +∞ (the case whereM (s ) = −∞
is impossible because we assumed M to be bounded below), the condition that Q↑
s
(M (s ·)) ≤ M (s ) does not
7To see this, note that the definition of an upper expectation in Reference [16] is different from the one we adopt here.
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impose any constraints onM (s ·). The interpretation that the incrementM (s ·)−M (s ) represents an allowable
bet is, in this case, somewhat questionable. However, one could argue that, since the processM has reached
the maximum possible value—that is, +∞—in the situation s , it cannot increase any further, hence there is no
need for any constraints on the process’ future value.
That the allowable bets f in some situation s ∈X ∗ are characterised by the condition that Q↑
s
( f )≤ 0, agrees
with the behavioural interpretation of (boundedly) coherent upper expectations. To see this, we limit ourselves
to the domain L (X ) and recall that Q ↑
s
( f ) = Qs ( f ), for any f ∈ L (X ), can then be interpreted as a subject’s
infimum selling price for the gamble f . So the subject, being the forecasting system in this case, is willing to
offer the gambles that have negative8 upper expectation. We can then take the subject up on his commitments
by accepting its offer and selecting one such gamble. Moreover, since the upper expectations Qs are assumed to
be (boundedly) coherent, the associated sets of available gambles will also satisfy certain rationality axioms. We
refer to an earlier paper by one of us [17] for a more elaborate discussion of howWalley’s behavioural approach
can be related (in a slightly different context) to the game-theoretic one proposed by Shafer and Vovk.
Ourdefinitionof the global game-theoretic upper expectation—and theone considered byShafer andVovk—
will be based on bounded below supermartingales, not only because it allows for a sensible interpretation as we
have explained above, but also because of more technical reasons, which we discuss in [16, Section 8]. So let
Mb be the set of all such bounded below supermartingales. For anyM ∈Mb, we then use liminfM to denote
the extended real global variable that assumes the value liminfn→+∞M (ωn ) in each ω ∈ Ω. We also write, for
any situation s ∈ X ∗ and any two f and g in V, that f ≥s g if f (ω) ≥ g (ω) for all paths ω ∈ Γ (s ). The global
game-theoretic upper expectation EV : V×X ∗→R can now be defined as
EV( f |s ) := inf
¦
M (s ) :M ∈Mb and liminfM ≥s f
©
for all f ∈V and all s ∈X ∗.
The corresponding game-theoretic lower expectation EV is again defined by conjugacy; so EV ( f |s ) :=−EV (− f |s )
for all f ∈ V and all s ∈ X ∗. For a concrete and detailed motivation and interpretation for the operator EV , we
refer to [3, 4, 16]. Essentially, the upper expectation EV( f |x1:n ) can oncemore be seen as an infimum selling price
for a variable f ∈ V conditional on the fact that we have observed some history X1 = x1,X2 = x2, · · · ,Xn = xn of
the process. It is based on the assumption that we should agree to sell f for any starting capitalM (x1:n ) such
that, by appropriately betting against the forecasting system from x1:n onwards, we manage to end up with a
higher capital than what we would receive from f , regardless of the pathω ∈ Ω taken by the process. Indeed, it
is reasonable to state that such a starting capitalM (x1:n ) is worth more than the uncertain (possibly negative)
payoff corresponding to f . The global game-theoretic upper expectation EV ( f |x1:n ) is the infimumover all such
starting capitals.
As we will briefly discuss in Section 7, the global game-theoretic upper expectation EV satisfies various, re-
markably powerful properties. In particular, it satisfies P1–P5, P3=, P6 and P7, which allows us to state our main
result: that EV is the unique most conservative upper expectation EA in E1−5(Q). Our proofs for these results are
heavily based on our work in [16]. The setting there is entirely the same as the one described in this section, with
the exception that we generally do not impose C9 on the local models in [16]. It will soon be clarified why we
havemade this distinction; for themoment, it suffices to see that the setting in [16] ismore general and therefore,
that the results in [16] obviously remain valid here.
Proposition 5. EV is an element of E1−5(Q) and furthermore satisfies P3
=, P6 and P7.
Proof. We prove that EV satisfies P1–P5, P3
=, P6 and P7. AxiomP1 follows immediately from [16, Proposition 14]
which, in particular, says that E( f |x1:n ) = Qx1:n ( f (x1:n ·)) for any situation x1:n ∈ X
∗ and any (n + 1)-measurable
gamble f . Indeed, for any h ∈ L (X ), h (Xn+1) is an (n + 1)-measurable gamble, so it follows from [16, Proposi-
tion 14] that EV (h (Xn+1)|x1:n ) =Qx1:n (h ). To prove P2, observe that liminfM ≥s f if and only if liminfM ≥s f Is
for all f ∈V and allM ∈Mb. The desired equality therefore follows directly from the definition of EV . P3=, and
hence also P3, follows immediately from [16, Theorem 15]. Property P4 follows from [16, Proposition 13(V4)],
which says that EV satisfies the stronger property that E( f |s )≤ E(g |s ) if f ≤s g for all f ,g ∈V and all s ∈X ∗.
8In the interest of brevity, we ignore in our discussion of the interpretation the special case where we have zero upper expectation. See
[17] for more details about this special case.
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Furthermore, P6 and P7 follow from, respectively, [16, Theorem 32] and [16, Proposition 28]. Note that, in
these results, the definition of Vb,lim seems to be slightly more general, since it there also includes pointwise
limits of possibly extended real finitary variables. However, according to [16, Proposition 30], any such limit of
extended real finitary variables is in fact also a pointwise limit of n-measurable, and therefore finitary, gambles.
So both our definitions of Vb,lim are equivalent, therefore indeed allowing us to apply the results in [16] here.
Finally, Property P5 follows from [16, Corollary 25], which says that, for any sequence { fn}n∈N0 in Vb that is
uniformly bounded below, EV (liminfn→+∞ fn |s )≤ liminfn→+∞EV ( fn |s ). Indeed, in the special case that { fn}n∈N0
is a sequence of finitary gambles that is uniformly bounded below and converges pointwise to some variable
f ∈Vb, this implies that EV( f |s )≤ liminfn→+∞EV ( fn |s )≤ limsupn→+∞EV ( fn |s ).
Theorem 6. There is a unique most conservative upper expectation EA in E1−5(Q) and it is the global game-
theoretic upper expectation EV . Furthermore, if an upper expectation E in E1−5(Q) satisfies P3=, P6 and P7, then
it is equal to this most conservative upper expectation EA, and therefore also equal to EV .
Proof. Immediately from Theorem 4 and Proposition 5.
7. On the Implications of Theorem 6
Shafer and Vovk define their game-theoretic upper expectations using supermartingales. Their definition
has a constructive flavour and can be given a clear interpretation in terms of capital processes and betting be-
haviour. However, it requires that one allows unbounded and even infinite-valued bets, which we find more
questionable from a behavioural point of view. Furthermore, a complete axiomatisation of EV is, to the best of
our knowledge, absent from the literature. Theorem 6 addresses both of these issues. First, it provides an ab-
stract axiomatisation for EV using P3=, P6 and P7 in addition to P1–P5. Most importantly, however, Theorem 6
provides an alternative definition— and interpretation—for EV as the most conservative upper expectation EA
under a limited set of intuitive properties: P1–P5. This strengthens the argument in favour of using EV as a global
upper expectation, because it can nowbemotivated fromboth a game-theoretic point of view and from apurely
axiomatic point of view. Readers need not even be familiar with the concepts of game-theoretic probability in
order to use EV as global upper expectation. Put simply, they only have to agree on the axiomsP1–P5. And even if
they wish to impose additional axioms, then EV would still serve as a conservative upper bound for their desired
(upper) expectation.
Still, recalling our assumptions about the extended local models Q↑
s
, one could regret the fact that we are
only considering a special case of what is generally being done by Shafer and Vovk; an upper expectation Q↑
s
on
L (X ) satisfying E1–E5 doesnot necessarily have to be anextension of a coherent upper expectationQs onL (X )
satisfying C8 and C9, see [16, Example 1]. However, this restriction in generality actually turns out to be rather
desirable. Indeed, as we show in [16], compatibility of local and global game-theoretic upper expectations—a
property that we find essential—can only be obtained if we limit ourselves to extended local models Q ↑
s
of the
form that we have described earlier, that is, boundedly coherent and satisfying C8 and C9.
That said, as mentioned before, we do not a priori impose C9 on the local models in [16]. In that paper, we
mainly focus on themathematical properties of global game-theoretic upper expectations andmost of these do
not require C9. Furthermore, by dropping this axiom, we can allow for more general local models than Shafer
and Vovk, who impose E1–E5. Nevertheless, in this less mathematical andmore philosophical contribution, we
do impose C9 on the local models because, practically speaking, we always want local and global belief models
to be compatible; see for example Section 4, where we considered it self-evident that P1 should be desirable.
Note however that Theorem 6 actually does not depend on whether the extended local models Q ↑
s
satisfy C9.
On the one hand, because EA only depends on the (boundedly) coherent local models Qs , and on the other
hand, because EV only depends onwhat the values of the extended localmodels Q
↑
s
are on the restricted domain
L b(X ). The latter can easily be seen from the fact that EV is defined using supermartingales that are bounded
below; we refer to [16] for more details.
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8. Additional Properties
Of course, there is more to an uncertainty model than an axiomatisation or an interpretation, however com-
pelling they may be. In order to be practically useful, its mathematical properties should also be sufficiently
powerful such that inferences can be computed or approximated efficiently. For instance, the popularity of the
Lebesgue integral as a tool for defining expected values, is in part due to its strong continuity properties (e.g.
the Dominated Convergence Theorem [1, 12]). What may perhaps be somewhat surprising, is that despite the
simplicity of our axioms P1–P5, our most conservative model EA also scores well on this count. For example, it
satisfies the following generalisation of bounded coherence. Its proof, as well as the proofs of the other results in
this section, follows immediately from the fact that EA coincides with EV and the fact that these properties hold
for EV , as is shown in [16].
Proposition 7. [16, Proposition 13 and Theorem 15] For all f ,g ∈ V, all λ ∈ R≥0, all µ ∈ R, all n ∈ N0 and all
s ∈X ∗, EA satisfies
V1. infω∈Γ (s ) f (ω)≤ EA( f |s )≤ EA( f |s )≤ supω∈Γ (s ) f (ω);
V2. EA( f + g |s )≤ EA( f |s ) +EA(g |s );
V3. EA(λ f |s ) =λEA( f |s );
V4. EA( f +µ|s ) = EA( f |s ) +µ.
V5. EA( f |X1:n ) = EA
 
EA( f |X1:n+1)
X1:n .
Another important result, better known as Fatou’s Lemma, shows that the upper bound imposed by property
P5 for a global upper expectation E( f |s ) of a variable f ∈ Vb,lim need not be attained by the most conservative
upper expectation EA in E1−5(Q). Interestingly enough, it can be replaced by a generally tighter one, which is
established in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. [16, Corollary 25] For any s ∈X ∗ and any sequence { fn}n∈N0 in Vb that is uniformly bounded below,
EA(liminfn→+∞ fn |s )≤ liminfn→+∞EA( fn |s ).
The following theoremstates that EA satisfies continuitywith respect tonon-decreasing sequencesof bounded
below variables and with respect to non-increasing sequences of finitary, bounded above variables.
Theorem 9. [16, Theorem 23 and Theorem 31]
i. For any s ∈ X ∗ and any non-decreasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 in Vb that converges point-wise to a variable
f ∈Vb, we have that EA( f |s ) = limn→+∞EA( fn |s ).
ii. For any s ∈X ∗ and any non-increasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 of finitary, bounded above variables that converges
point-wise to a variable f ∈V, we have that EA( f |s ) = limn→+∞EA( fn |s ).
Apart from the brief overview above, EV = EA also satisfies a weak and a strong law of large numbers, a law
of the iterated logarithm, Lévy’s zero-one law, andmany more surprisingly strong properties; we refer the inter-
ested reader to Shafer and Vovk’s work [4, 13] and to ours [16, 18].
9. Measure-Theoretic Belief Models
In contradistinction with the game-theoretic approach, where the central concept is that of a supermartin-
gale, the measure-theoretic approach relies on σ-additive probability measures in order to describe the global
dynamics of an uncertain process. In a precise probabilities context, this global measure is usually obtained by
extending the information that is included in the (precise) local models, now represented by probability mass
functions onX , using Ionescu Tulcea’s extension theorem [1, Theorem II.9.2]. This consists of two consecutive
steps. First, a probabilitymeasure on the algebra generated by all cylinder events is constructed in a straightfor-
ward manner, by combining local (conditional) probabilities using the well-known product rule. Subsequently,
13
this probability measure is extended to a probability measure on the σ-algebra F generated by all cylinder
events, which, according to CarathÃl’odory’s extension theorem [5, Theorem 1.7], can be done uniquely. Lin-
ear expectations are then typically obtained by Lebesgue integration and by restricting the domain to (random)
variables that are measurable with respect to theσ-algebraF .
This traditional measure-theoretic approach has a few shortcomings however. First of all, it only considers
the special case where each local model is represented by a single probability mass function onX . Hence, we
cannot directly apply it here in our more general, imprecise probabilities setting. Secondly, the domain of the
expectation operators is restricted to measurable (random) variables and therefore, no explicit information is
given about non-measurable variables. Thirdly, by condensing all local probabilitymass functions into a single
global probability measure, we disregard part of the information that is incorporated in the local probability
mass functions. More specifically, the part that describes the process’ dynamics conditional on the fact that its
path will lie in a set of probability zero (with respect to the global probability measure). Indeed, conditional
probabilities and expectations are typically derived from the global probability measure using Bayes’ rule, yet,
for those caseswhere the conditioning event has probability zero, the conditional probabilities and expectations
become ill-defined or are chosen arbitrarily; see Appendix A and [1, 2].
In this section, we aim to adapt the traditionalmeasure-theoretic approach to our setting anddealwith these
problems in a satisfactory manner. As a first step, we will limit ourselves to the precise case and try to resolve
the last two issues mentioned above. The global probability measure on F , which is the starting point for the
traditional approach, will be replaced by a ‘conditional probabilitymeasure’ in the sense of [9, Definition 6]. Es-
sentially, such a conditional measure specifies a probability measure on F for each situation s ∈ X ∗, which
describes the global dynamics of the uncertain process if we are sure that the path ω taken by the process will
pass through this situation s . This will enable us to also meaningfully define linear expectations conditional
on situations that have probability zero. Subsequently, we will extend the domain of these conditional linear
expectation operators to all global variables V by taking a particular upper integral leading to an upper expect-
ation. As a final step, we allow for imprecision in the local models by considering a set Ps of probability mass
functions onX in each situation s . We can then apply the foregoing course of reasoning for each possible selec-
tion p : s ∈ X ∗ 7→ p (·|s ) of local probability mass functions, where, in each situation s , the selected probability
mass function p (·|s ) belongs to Ps . Hence, instead of a single upper expectation operator, we now obtain a set
of them. The globalmeasure-theoretic upper expectation Emeas will then be defined as the upper envelope of all
such ‘compatible’ upper expectation operators, similar to what is done on a local level.
The resulting operator Emeas will satisfy P1–P5, which implies by Theorem 6 that the upper expectation EA—
and therefore also EV—is an upper bound for Emeas. Moreover, if all local models are precise, all upper expecta-
tion operators EA, EV and Emeas will be shown to coincide.
Precise Probability Trees
In this subsection, we consider a precise probability tree p , that is, a map p : s ∈X ∗ 7→ p (·|s )where each p (·|s )
is a probability mass function onX . Recalling our considerations in Section 2, each mass function p (·|s ) is in a
one-to-one correspondence with a linear expectationQs onL (X ), so we could just as well have started from an
imprecise probability tree Q where all local models Qs are linear on L (X ). However, we prefer to start with p
because it is in accordance with the traditional measure-theoretic view towards uncertainty, where probability
measures or charges—and therefore also probability mass functions—are considered to be primary objects.
As mentioned above, we aim to construct a conditional probability measure that allows us to condition on
any situation s ∈ X ∗ meaningfully. To do so, we follow the same reasoning as proposed in [9, Chapter 3]. First,
we define, for any x1:n ∈ X
∗, a probability charge P(·|x1:n ) on the algebra generated by all cylinder events. This
can be done in a simple and intuitive manner [9, Lemma 14]: for anym ∈N0 and any C ⊆X
m , we let
P(C |x1:n ) :=
∑
z1:m∈C
P(z1:m |x1:n ), where P(z1:m |x1:n ) :=


∏m−1
i=n
p (zi+1|z1:i ) if n <m and z1:n = x1:n
1 if n ≥m and z1:m = x1:m
0 otherwise,
(6)
where we use the shorthand notation P(C |x1:n ) for any C ⊆ X
m to mean P(∪z1:m∈C Γ (z1:m )|x1:n ), and where we
did not make any particular distinction between the notations z1:m and {z1:m}. Since each P(·|x1:n ) defined in
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this way is a (finitely additive) probability charge on the algebra generated by all cylinder events [9, Chapter
3], and therefore automatically a σ-addive probability measure on this algebra [2, Theorem 2.3], we can use
CarathÃl’odory’s extension theorem [5, Theorem 1.7] to extend each P(·|x1:n ) to a uniqueσ-additivemeasure on
the σ-algebra F generated by all cylinder events. Then, according to [9, Theorem 15], we can gather all such
probabilitymeasures P(·|x1:n ) to obtain a single conditional probabilitymeasure P :F ×X
∗→R [9, Definition 6],
which is coherent in the sense of [9, Definition 5]. This notion of coherence is related to the bounded coherence
condition in Section 2; both notions represent rational behaviour, but, the version used in [9, Definition 5] is
adapted to probability measures and involves conditioning on events.
Beforedefiningourglobalmeasure-theoretic (upper) expectation,wefirst recall the following concepts about
measurability and integration; we refer to Appendix A for a more elaborate introduction. We say that a global
variable f ∈ V is F -measurable if, for all c ∈ R, the set {ω ∈ Ω : f (ω) ≤ c } is F -measurable, meaning that
it is an element of the σ-algebra F . We will commonly use the properties that F -measurability of variables
is preserved under taking maxima or minima (this follows immediately from the fact that the class of all F -
measurable sets is closed under countable unions and intersections [1, Section II.4]) and thatF -measurability
is preserved under pointwise convergence of variables [1, Theorem II.4.2]. Moreover, recall that the Lebesgue
integral
∫
Ω
f dPu [1, 2, 12] with respect to any (unconditional) probability measure Pu on F always exists if f
is F -measurable and either bounded or non-negative. However, for a general F -measurable variable f ∈V,
the integral only exists if min{
∫
Ω
f +dPu,
∫
Ω
f −dPu} < +∞, where f + := f ∨0 and f − := − f ∧0. In that case, we let∫
Ω
f dPu :=
∫
Ω
f +dPu−
∫
Ω
f −dPu. Then, because the Lebesgue integral is trivially real-valued for a bounded F -
measurable variable (this can for instance be deduced fromM1 andM2 in Appendix A), it can easily be seen that∫
Ω
f dPu also always exists for anF -measurable variable f ∈Vb.
We now adopt an approach that is similar to what is done in a traditional context, defining expectations as
Lebesgue integrals. An important difference, however, is that we integrate with respect to a probabilitymeasure
that depends on the conditioning event. Concretely, we define the measure-theoretic expectation Emeas,p ( f |s )
of an F -measurable variable f ∈ V conditional on the situation s ∈ X ∗ by the Lebesgue integral
∫
Ω
f dP|s
with respect to the (unconditional) probability measure P|s := P(·|s ), provided that
∫
Ω
f dP|s exists. The expecta-
tion Emeas,p (·|) then corresponds to the unconditional expectation as introduced in traditional measure theory.
The subscript p in Emeas,p is used to remind us that Emeas,p depends on the precise probability tree p . Since
Emeas,p is defined in terms of the Lebesgue integral, it inherits several properties of this integral; again, we refer
to Appendix A for more information. The following is a subset of these properties—simplified and applied to
Emeas,p—that we will need in the main text. We take s ∈ X ∗ to be any situation and implicitly assume that the
considered expectations exist.
M1. Emeas,p (a f + b |s ) = aEmeas,p ( f |s ) + b for allF -measurable variables f ∈V and all a ,b ∈R.
M2. f ≤ g ⇒ Emeas,p ( f |s )≤ Emeas,p (g |s ) for allF -measurable variables f ,g ∈V.
M8. Consider anynon-decreasing sequence { fn }n∈N0 of F -measurable variables inV. If there is anF -measurable
function f ∗ such that Emeas,p ( f
∗|s )>−∞ and fn ≥ f
∗ for all n ∈N0, then
lim
n→+∞
Emeas,p ( fn |s ) = Emeas,p ( f |s ) where lim
n→+∞
fn = f .
M9. Consider anynon-increasing sequence { fn }n∈N0 of F -measurable variables inV. If there is anF -measurable
function f ∗ such that Emeas,p ( f ∗|s )<+∞ and fn ≤ f ∗ for all n ∈N0, then
lim
n→+∞
Emeas,p ( fn |s ) = Emeas,p ( f |s ) where lim
n→+∞
fn = f .
Now that our measure-theoretic definitions are in place, we aim at relating the expectation Emeas,p to our
upper expectation operator EA discussed in the earlier sections of this paper. For the sake of clarity, we will
use EA,p to denote our upper expectation EA corresponding to the imprecise probability tree Q associated with
p ; so each Qs is defined by Qs ( f ) :=
∑
x∈X f (x )p (x |s ) for all f ∈ L (X ). We first focus on the domain of all
F -measurable variables in Vb. This seems appropriate because, though we cannot guarantee existence of the
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integral
∫
Ω
f dP|s—and therefore also Emeas,p ( f |s )—for a generalF -measurable variable f ∈V, it can always be
guaranteed for anF -measurable variable f ∈Vb, aswehaveexplainedearlier. Itwill turnout that bothoperators
Emeas,p and EA,p coincide on the domain of allF -measurable variables in Vb.
Toprove this, webase ourselves on [4, Theorem9.3]; a result by Shafer andVovk—yet the essential idea origin-
ates from Jean Ville—that shows that game-theoretic and measure-theoretic (upper) expectations coincide on
F -measurable gambles, in case we are considering precise probability trees. Proposition 10 below establishes
the equality of EA,p and Emeas,p on this domain and therefore, due to Theorem 6, also of EV and Emeas,p . Though
the proof of Proposition 10 is based on the same principles and ideas as those that underly the proof of [4, The-
orem 9.3], they are stated in a somewhat different setting and, for an unexperienced reader, it may therefore not
be entirely clear how both are related to each other. Moreover, our result here also applies to conditional expect-
ations, whereas [4, Theorem 9.3] only considers the unconditional case. We have therefore decided to include a
self-contained proof of Proposition 10 in Appendix B, starting from Ville’s martingale theorem.
Proposition 10. For anyF -measurable f ∈V and any s ∈X ∗, we have that Emeas,p ( f |s ) = EA,p ( f |s ).
The next result extends the domain of the equality to allF -measurable variables in Vb.
Theorem 11. For anyF -measurable f ∈Vb and any s ∈X
∗, we have that Emeas,p ( f |s ) = EA,p ( f |s ).
Proof. Consider any f ∈Vb that isF -measurable andany s ∈X
∗. Because f is boundedbelowandF -measurable,
Emeas,p ( f |s ) exists. We can moreover assume that f is non-negative without loss of generality because it is
bounded below and both Emeas,p and EA,p are constant additive with respect to real constants; see M1 and V4.
Consider now the non-decreasing sequence { f ∧n}n∈N0 of upper cuts and note that each f
∧n is bounded and
F -measurable; this follows from the fact thatF -measurability is preserved under taking minima. Using M8—
which we are allowed to use because Emeas,p ( f ∧0|s ) is real (since f ∧0 is bounded) and because { f ∧n }n∈N0 is non-
decreasing—we have that Emeas,p ( f |s ) = limn→+∞Emeas,p ( f
∧n |s ). As a consequence,
Emeas,p ( f |s ) = lim
n→+∞
Emeas,p ( f
∧n |s ) = lim
n→+∞
EA,p ( f
∧n |s ) = EA,p ( f |s ),
where the second equality follows from Proposition 10 and the third one from Theorem 9(i).
Next, we want to drop the condition ofF -measurability and generalise towards the domain V of all global
extended real variables. So we are looking for an upper expectation operator that appropriately extends Emeas,p
to the entire domainV×X ∗. Inspired by Theorem 11, we simply suggest the following upper integral:
E 1meas,p ( f |s ) := inf
¦
Emeas,p (g |s ) : g ∈Vb, g isF -measurable and g ≥ f
©
for all f ∈V and s ∈X ∗.
That it is valid to write Emeas,p (g |s ) for any g ∈Vb that isF -measurable, follows from the fact that Emeas,p (g |s ) =∫
Ω
g dP|s is guaranteed to exist for such a variable. Let us now show that E
1
meas,p is indeed an extension of Emeas,p .
Proposition 12. For any f ∈V and any s ∈X ∗, we have that E 1meas,p ( f |s ) = Emeas,p ( f |s ) if Emeas,p ( f |s ) exists.
Proof. Suppose that Emeas,p ( f |s ) exists, whichmeans that the variable f isF -measurable and that Emeas,p ( f
+|s )
or Emeas,p ( f −|s ) is real-valued. By the monotonicity [M2] of Emeas,p , we immediately have that
E 1meas,p ( f |s ) = inf
¦
Emeas,p (g |s ) : g ∈Vb, g isF -measurable and g ≥ f
©
≥ Emeas,p ( f |s ). (7)
If Emeas,p ( f
+|s ) = +∞ and therefore Emeas,p ( f
−|s ) ∈ R and Emeas,p ( f |s ) = +∞, the desired equality follows trivi-
ally from Equation (7). We proceed to show that this is also the case if Emeas,p ( f +|s )<+∞.
Consider the non-increasing sequence { f ∨−n }n∈N0 of lower cuts of f . Then, for anyn ∈N0, the global variable
f ∨−n is bounded below andF -measurable. Hence,
E 1meas,p ( f |s ) = inf
¦
Emeas,p (g |s ) : g ∈Vb, g isF -measurable and g ≥ f
©
≤ inf
n∈N0
Emeas,p ( f
∨−n |s ) = lim
n→+∞
Emeas,p ( f
∨−n |s ) = Emeas,p ( f |s ),
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where the second equality follows from the non-increasing character of the sequence { f ∨−n }n∈N0 and themono-
tonicity [M2] of Emeas,p , and the final equality follows from M9, which we can use because f ∨−n ≤ f ∨0 = f + for
all n ∈N0 and Emeas,p ( f
+|s )<+∞ by assumption. Combining this with Equation (7), the desired equality again
follows.
Our next result shows that E 1meas,p is in fact the most conservative extension of Emeas,p that satisfies P4.
Proposition 13. E 1meas,p is the most conservative extension of Emeas,p that satisfies P4.
Proof. Fix any f ∈V, any s ∈X ∗ and any E
′
p
:V×X ∗→R that satisfies P4 and that coincides with Emeas,p on its
domain. Then,
E 1meas,p ( f |s ) = inf
¦
Emeas,p (g |s ) : g ∈Vb, g isF -measurable and g ≥ f
©
= inf
¦
E
′
p
(g |s ) : g ∈Vb, g isF -measurable and g ≥ f
©
≥ E
′
p
( f |s ),
where the second equality follows from the fact that Emeas,p (g |s ) exists for any F -measurable variable g ∈ Vb,
and the inequality follows from the fact that E
′
p
satisfies monotonicity [P4]. Hence, the proposition now follows
immediately from the fact that, due to Proposition 12, E 1meas,p itself is an extension of Emeas,p and the fact that
E 1meas,p satisfies P4 because Emeas,p is monotone [M2].
In Section 4, we argued that P1–P5 are desirable for a global upper expectation and, under those axioms, we
put forward the most conservative upper expectation as our model of choice. Now, Proposition 13 guarantees
that E 1meas,p is the most conservative extension of Emeas,p only under P4. So it may very well be that E
1
meas,p does
not necessarily satisfy the axioms P1–P5. Since we consider these axioms to be desirable, that would mean that
E 1meas,p is a too conservative extensionof Emeas,p , in the sense that it results in anunwarranted loss of information.
Our following result assures that this is not the case; the extension E 1meas,p coincideswith EA,p and hence, E
1
meas,p
is guaranteed to satisfy P1–P5.
Theorem 14. For any f ∈V and any s ∈X ∗, we have that E 1meas,p ( f |s ) = EA,p ( f |s ).
Proof. For any f ∈V and any s ∈X ∗, we immediately find that
E 1meas,p ( f |s ) = inf
¦
Emeas,p (g |s ) : g ∈Vb, g isF -measurable and g ≥ f
©
= inf
¦
EA,p (g |s ) : g ∈Vb, g isF -measurable and g ≥ f
©
≥ EA,p ( f |s ),
where the second equality follows from Theorem 11 and the inequality from the monotonicity [P4] of EA,p . To
show that the converse inequality holds, wewill use the fact that EA,p satisfies P7 (this follows fromProposition 5
and Theorem 6).
Consider any g ∈ Vb,lim. Since g is the pointwise limit of a sequence {gn}n∈N0 of finitary gambles gn ∈ Vfin
and since any finitary gamble is clearlyF -measurable, g is the pointwise limit of a sequence ofF -measurable
global gambles. Then it follows that g itself is alsoF -measurable (F -measurability is preservedunderpointwise
convergence). Furthermore, by the definition of Vb,lim, g is also bounded below. Hence, Emeas,p (g |s ) exists and
due toTheorem11,wehave that EA,p (g |s ) = Emeas,p (g |s ). SinceE
1
meas,p is anextensionofEmeas,p byProposition12,
this implies that EA,p (g |s ) = E
1
meas,p (g |s ). We conclude that
EA,p ( f |s ) = inf
¦
EA,p (g |s ) : g ∈Vb,lim and g ≥ f
©
= inf
¦
E 1meas,p (g |s ) : g ∈Vb,lim and g ≥ f
©
≥ E 1meas,p ( f |s ),
where the first step follows fromP7 and the last step follows from themonotoniciy [P4] of E 1meas,p (as established
by Proposition 13).
Theorem 14 does not only show us that E 1meas,p satisfies P1–P5, but also, and more importantly, that it is the
most conservative global upper expectation satisfying P1–P5. Furthermore, if we combine Theorem 14 with
Proposition 13, it can also easily be seen that it is the most conservative extension of Emeas,p satisfying P1–P5.
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Corollary 15. E 1meas,p is the most conservative extension of Emeas,p that satisfies P1–P5.
Proof. We know from Proposition 13 that E 1meas,p is the most conservative extension of Emeas,p that satisfies P4.
This implies in particular that E 1meas,p is more (or at least as) conservative than any extension of Emeas,p that
satisfies P1–P5. Since E 1meas,p itself satisfies P1–P5 due to Theorem 14, it follows that E
1
meas,p is indeed the most
conservative extension of Emeas,p satisfying P1–P5.
Another interesting consequence of Theorem 14 and Proposition 13 is that EA,p turns out to coincide with
Emeas,p on the entire domain where it is defined, or, in other words, our model EA,p is an extension of the tradi-
tional measure-theoretic expectation Emeas,p .
Corollary 16. For any f ∈V and any s ∈X ∗, we have that EA,p ( f |s ) = Emeas,p ( f |s ) if Emeas,p ( f |s ) exists.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Theorem 14 and Proposition 13.
Now, before we continue to consider themore general case of imprecise probability trees, we briefly want to
come back to our choice of the extension E 1meas,p . Recall that we defined it as an upper approximation—called
an upper integral—with respect to allF -measurable variables inVb. However, one could rightfully wonder why
we approximate with respect to this particular domain. It turned out to be a suitable choice, as Corollary 15
shows, but there was a priori no concrete reason for doing so. We could just as well have adopted the following
alternative upper integral:9
E 2meas,p ( f |s ) := inf

Emeas,p (g |s ) : g ∈V,Emeas,p (g |s ) exists and g ≥ f

for all f ∈V and s ∈X ∗.
The upper expectation E 2meas,p is an extension of Emeas,p because Emeas,p is monotone [M2]. Moreover, it is also
clear that E 2meas,p ( f |s ) is dominated by E
1
meas,p ( f |s ) for all f ∈ V and all s ∈ X ∗ because the infimum in E
2
meas,p
is taken over an equal or larger set than the set over which the infimum is taken in E 1meas,p . Hence, one could
be tempted to adopt the upper integral E 2meas,p instead of E
1
meas,p with the aim of obtaining a more informative
extension—recall thatwe regardhigherupper expectations as less informative. However, it can straightforwardly
be shown that this is only vain hope.
Proposition 17. We have that E 1meas,p ( f |s ) = E
2
meas,p ( f |s ) for all f ∈V and all s ∈X
∗.
Proof. Fix any f ∈ V and any s ∈ X ∗. That E 1meas,p ( f |s ) ≥ E
2
meas,p ( f |s ) follows immediately from the fact that
Emeas,p (g |s ) exists for eachF -measurable variable g ∈Vb and therefore, that the infimum in E
2
meas,p ( f |s ) is taken
over a set that is at least as large as the set over which the infimum is taken in E 1meas,p ( f |s ). On the other hand,
we have that
E 2meas,p ( f |s ) = inf

Emeas,p (g |s ) : g ∈V,Emeas,p (g |s ) exists and g ≥ f

= inf

E 1meas,p (g |s ) : g ∈V,Emeas,p (g |s ) exists and g ≥ f

≥ E 1meas,p ( f |s ),
where the second equality follows from Proposition 12 and the inequality follows from the monotonicity of
E 1meas,p (see Proposition 13).
Hence, bothmeasure-theoretic extensions E 1meas,p and E
2
meas,p are equal and therefore, by Theorem 14, both
of themcoincidewithourmodel EA,p which, on its turn, coincideswith the game-theoretic upper expectationEV
according to Theorem 6. In summary, we conclude that, if the local models are precise, all of the three possible
approaches—the game-theoretic, the measure-theoretic and ours—are equivalent.
9This upper integral seems to be the one used by Shafer and Vovk in [4, Chapter 9].
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Imprecise Probability Trees
Let us now turn to the general case where we consider an imprecise probability tree Q for which the local
models Qs are (boundedly) coherent upper expectations that are not necessarily self-conjugate. As we have
explained earlier, these localmodels can equivalently be represented by sets Ps of probabilitymass functions on
X , where Ps :=PQs is related to Qs according to Equations (1) and (2) for all s ∈X
∗. We call a precise probability
tree p : s ∈X ∗ 7→ p (·|s ) compatible with the imprecise probability tree Q and write that p ∼Q if p (·|s ) ∈ Ps for all
s ∈ X ∗. In other words, a compatible precise probability tree p ∼Q corresponds to a possible selection, where
a local probability mass function p (·|s ) is chosen from the set Ps for each situation s ∈ X ∗. Now, for any such
compatible tree p ∼ Q, we can consider the global upper expectation Emeas,p := E
1
meas,p = E
2
meas,p as defined in
the previous section. Hence, instead of a single upper expectation, we now obtain a set of compatible global
upper expectations. We define the global measure-theoretic upper expectation Emeas as the upper envelope over
all such compatible upper expectations:
Emeas( f |s ) := sup
¦
Emeas,p ( f |s ) : p ∼Q
©
for all f ∈V and s ∈X ∗.
This definition is in correspondence with the usual measure-theoretic view towards imprecision where it is re-
garded as partial information about a single, unknown probabilitymeasure. Upper (and lower) expectations are
then considered as upper (and lower) bounds on the set of all ‘possible’ linear expectations. A similar, yet uncon-
ditional version of thismeasure-theoretic upper expectation is also adopted by Shafer and Vovk in [4, Chapter 9].
As we will now show, the measure-theoretic upper expectation Emeas satisfies our axioms P1–P5. This im-
plies, by Theorem 6, that Emeas is always dominated by the global upper expectation EA, and therefore also by EV .
Moreover, that the operator Emeas is entirely based on a measure-theoretic view towards uncertainty, yet turns
out to satisfy our axioms P1–P5, can only be seen as an additional motivation for the use of these axioms.
Theorem 18. The global measure-theoretic upper expectation Emeas is an element of E1−5(Q).
Proof. To show that P1 holds, consider any f ∈L (X ) and any x1:n ∈ X ∗. Since f (Xn+1) is bounded and clearly
F -measurable, we have, for any p ∼Q, that Emeas,p ( f (Xn+1)|x1:n ) exists and therefore that Emeas,p ( f (Xn+1)|x1:n ) =
Emeas,p ( f (Xn+1)|x1:n ), due to Proposition 12. Moreover, using P|x1:n (xn+1) to denote P|x1:n (∪z1:n∈X n Γ (z1:n xn+1)) for
any xn+1 ∈X , it is clear that Emeas,p ( f (Xn+1)|x1:n ) =
∑
xn+1∈X
f (xn+1)P|x1:n (xn+1). It also follows immediately from
the construction (6) of P|x1:n = P(·|x1:n ) that P|x1:n (xn+1) = P|x1:n (x1:n+1) = p (xn+1|x1:n ) for all xn+1 ∈ X and p ∼ Q.
Hence,
Emeas( f (Xn+1)|x1:n ) = sup
¦
Emeas,p ( f (Xn+1)|x1:n ) : p ∼Q
©
= sup
¦
Emeas,p ( f (Xn+1)|x1:n ) : p ∼Q
©
= sup
 ∑
xn+1∈X
f (xn+1)p (xn+1|x1:n ) : p ∼Q

= sup
 ∑
xn+1∈X
f (xn+1)p (xn+1|x1:n ) : p (·|x1:n ) ∈ Px1:n

=Qx1:n ( f ),
where the last step follows from the relation between Px1:n and Qx1:n which is given by Equation (2).
The remaining properties P2–P5 can be easily derived from the definition of Emeas and the fact that, due to
Corollary15, theseproperties are satisfiedbyeachcompatibleEmeas,p . ForPropertiesP2 andP4 this is immediate.
To see that P3 holds, consider any f ∈ Vfin and any n ∈ N0. Note that, for any compatible tree p ∼ Q and any
x1:n ∈X
n , we have that Emeas,p ( f |x1:n )≤ Emeas,p (Emeas,p ( f |X1:n+1)|x1:n ) because Emeas,p satisfies P3. Hence,
Emeas( f |x1:n ) = sup
¦
Emeas,p ( f |x1:n ) : p ∼Q
©
≤ sup
¦
Emeas,p
 
Emeas,p ( f |X1:n+1)|x1:n

: p ∼Q
©
≤ sup
¦
Emeas,p
 
Emeas( f |X1:n+1)|x1:n

: p ∼Q
©
= Emeas
 
Emeas( f |X1:n+1)|x1:n

,
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where the second inequality follows from the monotonicity [P4] of Emeas,p and the fact that Emeas,p ( f |z1:n+1) ≤
Emeas( f |z1:n+1) for allp ∼Q and all z1:n+1 ∈X n+1. The inequality aboveholds for any x1:n ∈X n , sowe indeedfind
that Emeas( f |X1:n )≤ Emeas
 
Emeas( f |X1:n+1)|X1:n

. To prove P5, we consider any s ∈X ∗ and any sequence { fn}n∈N0
of finitary gambles that is uniformly bounded below and that converges pointwise to some variable f ∈ V. For
any compatible tree p ∼Q, Emeas,p satisfies P5 and therefore, Emeas,p ( f |s ) ≤ limsupn→+∞Emeas,p ( fn |s ). Then we
also have that
Emeas( f |s ) = sup
¦
Emeas,p ( f |s ) : p ∼Q
©
≤ sup
¦
limsup
n→+∞
Emeas,p ( fn |s ) : p ∼Q
©
≤ sup
¦
limsup
n→+∞

sup
¦
Emeas,p ′ ( fn |s ) : p
′ ∼Q
©
: p ∼Q
©
= limsup
n→+∞

sup
¦
Emeas,p ′ ( fn |s ) : p
′ ∼Q
©
= limsup
n→+∞
Emeas( fn |s ).
As mentioned before, the result above implies, in combination with Theorem 6, that Emeas is dominated by
our model EA.
Corollary 19. We have that Emeas( f |s )≤ EA( f |s ) = EV ( f |s ) for all f ∈V and all s ∈X
∗.10
Proof. Immediate consequence of Theorem 6 and Theorem 18.
10. Conclusion
We have put forward a small set of simple axioms P1–P5 and argued that they are desirable for a global upper
expectation in the context of discrete-time finite-state uncertain processes. We have established the existence
of a unique most conservative model under these axioms, and have in addition given sufficient conditions to
uniquely characterise this most conservative model. Using this characterisation, we have shown that our most
conservative upper expectation coincideswith a version of the game-theoretic upper expectationused by Shafer
andVovk, and thereforehasparticularlypowerfulmathematical properties, despite the simplicityof ourdefining
axioms.
We also considered an alternative, more traditional measure-theoretic approach, where we defined a global
belief model using an upper envelope of upper integrals corresponding to compatible precise probability trees.
We have shown that this model satisfies axioms P1–P5 and therefore, that our most conservative model gives
guaranteed upper bounds on the value of this measure-theoretic upper expectation. For precise probability
trees, both models, and consequently also the game-theoretic model, coincide. It remains to be seen whether
this equivalence can be extended to the imprecise case. Shafer and Vovk have already obtained such an equival-
ence result, yet, only under strong topological conditions on the local models and for the domain of bounded
Suslin variables [4, Theorem 9.7].
Given our current findings, webelief there are a number of reasons why our globalmodel EA candidates as an
excellent choice when it comes to modelling discrete-time finite-state uncertain processes. First and foremost,
its definition is based on the axioms P1–P5; a set of properties which, in our opinion, are essential for a global
belief model to have. Our model EA is taken to be the most conservative or, equivalently, the least informative
model under these axioms because we do not want to include any further information. In this way, we obtain a
definition that is both convincing and interpretationally clear. Moreover, if one desires her global belief model
to also have other properties, additional to P1–P5, then our model EA would still serve as a conservative upper
bound for her model. As a second argument, we recall from Section 8 that our model EA possesses rather strong
continuity properties, as well as several fundamental probabilistic laws. Thirdly and lastly, our model EA coin-
cides with the game-theoretic upper expectation EV and dominates the measure-theoretic upper expectation
Emeas. Hence, our model EA plays an important role to anyone: for a person with a game-theoretic background,
the equivalentmodels EA andEV canbeused interchangeably and can therefore benefit fromeachothers proper-
ties; for a person with a measure-theoretic background, our model EA always gives a conservative upper bound
for the model Emeas.
10The fact that Emeas( f |)≤ EV ( f |) for all bounded below variables f ∈Vb was already obtained by Shafer and Vovk [4, Proposition 9.8].
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One counterargument that could be given to the plea above, is whether axiom P5 is really desirable or even
justified for a global beliefmodel. Our justification for it is based on the fact that we consider upper expectations
of non-finitary variables to be abstract idealisations of upper expectations of finitary variables. Still, this could be
seen as a rather artificial and unnecessary assumption, similar to the countable additivity property in measure
theory. However, compared to other common continuity properties, e.g. monotone convergence, property P5 is
fairly weak since it only applies to sequences of finitary gambles and only imposes an inequality on the value of
the global upper expectations. Moreover, that both the game-theoretic and themeasure-theoretic model satisfy
property P5, can only be seen as additional motivation to adopt it.
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Appendix A. Basic Measure-Theoretic Concepts
Ameasurable space (Y ,F ) is a couple, where Y is a non-empty set andF is a σ-algebra onY . We say that
A ⊆Y isF -measurable if A ∈F . Such a set A ∈F is also called an (F -measurable) event. We say that an exten-
ded real-valued function f :Y → R isF -measurable if the set f −1(A) := {y ∈ Y : f (y ) ∈ A} isF -measurable for
every A ∈B (R). Here,B (R) denotes the Borel algebra onR, being theσ-algebra generated by all open—or equi-
valently, closed—sets inR. Recall thatwe consider the usual order topologyonR and therefore, the Borel algebra
B (R) can alternatively be generated from the sets {x ∈R : x ≤ c } where c ∈R; see for instance [1, Section II.2.2].
Then, as we have done in the main text, we can alternatively characterise theF -measurable functions as those
functions f :Y → R such that {y ∈ Y : f (y ) ≤ c } isF -measurable for all c ∈ R [2, Theorem 13.1. (i)]. Typically,
anF -measurable (extended) real-valued function f is also called a random variable.
A probability space (Y ,F ,P) is a measurable space (Y ,F ) equipped with a σ-additive probability measure
P onF . We say that an event A ∈F is P-null if P(A) = 0. We will also say that a property about the elements in
Y holds P-almost surely (P-a.s.) if there is a P-null event A ∈ F such that the property holds for all y ∈ Y \ A.
Note that the intersection A ∩ B ∈ F of two P-almost sure events A,B ∈ F , is itself also P-almost sure. Now,
for any probability space (Y ,F ,P) and any extended real-valued function f :Y →R that isF -measurable, the
(measure-theoretic) expectation E( f ) of f will be defined using the Lebesgue integral [1, 2, 12]: E( f ) :=
∫
Y
f dP.
As we already mentioned in the main text, this integral is definitely well-defined if f is non-negative and is
otherwise only defined if min{
∫
Y
f +dP,
∫
Y
f −dP} < +∞, with f + = f ∨0 and f − = − f ∧0, in which case we let
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∫
Y
f dP :=
∫
Y
f +dP−
∫
Y
f −dP. When we say that ‘E( f ) exists’, we take this to mean that its defining integral∫
Y
f dP is well-defined. Furthermore, an extended real-valued function f : Y → R is called P-integrable if it is
F -measurable and
∫
Y
| f |dP =
∫
Y
f +dP+
∫
Y
f −dP <+∞.
The (measure-theoretic) conditional expectation E( f |G ) of a non-negative F -measurable extended real-
valued function f with respect to a σ-algebra G ⊆ F , is any extended real-valued function on Y that is G -
measurable and that satisfies
∫
A
f dP =
∫
A
E( f |G )dP or, equivalently,
∫
Y
f 1AdP =
∫
Y
E( f |G )1AdP for all A ∈G . If
f isF -measurable and non-negative, the conditional expectation E( f |G ) exists and is unique up to a P-null set
[1, Section II.7]. The value of E( f |G ) on a P-null set can be chosen arbitrarily since it will not change the value
of the integral
∫
A
E( f |G )dP =
∫
Y
E( f |G )1AdP; see Property M3 below. Similarly to the unconditional case, the
measure-theoretic conditional expectation E( f |G ) of a generalF -measurable extended real-valued function f
with respect to a σ-algebra G ⊆ F is only defined if min{E( f +|G ),E( f −|G )} < +∞ P-almost surely, and then
E( f |G ) := E( f +|G )−E( f −|G ) up to a P-null set. If f is P-integrable, such a conditional expectation E( f |G ) always
exists; see also [2, Section 34]. We moreover have the following convenient properties.
Lemma 20. For any probability space (Y ,F ,P) and any two extended real-valued functions f and g that areF -
measurable, the followingpropertieshold, provided that the consideredunconditional or conditional expectations
exist.
M1. E(a f + b ) = aE( f ) + b for all a ,b ∈R;
M2. f ≤ g ⇒ E( f )≤ E(g );
M3. f = g P-almost surely ⇒ E( f ) = E(g );
M4. E( f |F ) = f P-almost surely;
M5. E( f |G ∗) = E( f ) where G ∗ = {;,Y };
M6. E(E( f |G2)|G1) = E( f |G1) P-almost surely for every two σ-algebrasG1 ⊆G2 ⊆F .
M7. inf f ≤ E( f |G ) P-almost surely and E( f |G )≤ sup f P-almost surely for anyσ-algebra G ⊆F ;
Proof. Let us first show thatM5 follows from [1, Section II.7.4(E*)]. There, it is stated that E( f |G ∗) = E( f ) holds P-
almost surely. However, sinceG ∗ = {;,Y } and E( f |G ∗) is G ∗-measurable, we find that E( f |G ∗)must be constant.
So if E( f |G ∗) = E( f ) holds P-almost surely, it also holds on the entire domainY .
ToprovePropertyM1, consider [1, Section II.7.4(D*)]which inparticular states that E(a f +b |G ∗) = aE( f |G ∗)+
E(b |G ∗) P-almost surely. Since E(b |G ∗) = b P-almost surely by [1, Section II.7.4(A*)], we have that E(a f +b |G ∗) =
aE( f |G ∗)+b P-almost surely, which byM5 implies that E(a f +b ) = aE( f )+b P-almost surely. Since both sides
are constants, M1 follows.
Property M2 follows from [1, Section II.7.4(B*)], which states that E( f |G ∗)≤ E(g |G ∗) P-almost surely if f ≤ g
P-almost surely. Indeed, if f ≤ g , then certainly f ≤ g P-almost surely and then [1, Section II.7.4(B*)] together
withM5 implies that E( f )≤ E(g ) P-almost surely; since both sides are constants, M2 follows.
To prove M3, note that f = g P-almost surely implies that both f ≤ g P-almost surely and f ≥ g P-almost
surely. Then M3 follows by applying the previous reasoning to both of these inequalities. Furthermore, Proper-
ties M4 andM6 are taken directly from [1, Section II.7.4].
To see that property M7 holds, consider [1, Section II.7.4(A*)], which in particular says that E(sup f |G ) =
sup f P-almost surely. Combining this with mononicity [1, Section II.7.4(B*)], and taking into account that the
intersection of two P-almost sure events is itself also P-almost sure, we indeed find that E( f |G )≤ sup f P-almost
surely. The fact that inf f ≤ E( f |G ) P-almost surely can then easily be obtained using the linearity of E(·|G ) [1,
Section II.7.4(D*)].
Lemma 21. Consider any probability space (Y ,F ,P), any σ-algebra G ⊆F and any sequence { fn}n∈N0 of exten-
ded real-valued functions such that fn isF -measurable for all n ∈N0.
M8. If { fn}n∈N0 is non-decreasing and there is anF -measurable function f
∗ such that E( f ∗)>−∞ and fn ≥ f ∗
for all n ∈N0, then
lim
n→+∞
E( fn ) = E( f )where lim
n→+∞
fn = f .
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M9. If { fn}n∈N0 is non-increasing and there is anF -measurable function f
∗ such that E( f ∗) <+∞ and fn ≤ f
∗
for all n ∈N0, then
lim
n→+∞
E( fn ) = E( f )where lim
n→+∞
fn = f .
Proof. Both properties can directly be obtained by applying M5 to the properties stated in [1, Theorem II.7.2]
and observing that both sides of the acquired equations will be constants (allowing us to infer that the equations
always hold, instead of P-almost surely as is the case for the more general versions in [1, Theorem II.7.2]).
A (discrete) filtration {Fn }n∈N0 on a measurable space (Y ,F ) is a sequence of increasing σ-algebras in F ;
so F0 ⊆ F1 ⊆ · · ·F . We will then also use F∞ to denote the smallest σ-algebra σ(∪n∈N0Fn ) generated by the
σ-algebras Fn . We say that (Y ,F ,{Fn}n∈N0 ) is a filtered measurable space if (Y ,F ) is equipped with a filtra-
tion {Fn}n∈N0 , and moreover say that (Y ,F ,{Fn}n∈N0 ,P) is a filtered probability space if it additionally has a
σ-additivemeasure P onF . A sequence {Nn}n∈N0 of extended real-valued functions on Y is called ameasure-
theoretic process in a filtered probability space (Y ,F ,{Fn}n∈N0 ,P) if Nn is Fn -measurable for all n ∈ N0. It is
moreover called a measure-theoretic martingale if Nn is real-valued and E(Nn+1|Fn ) = Nn P-almost surely for
alln ∈N0, where the existence of E(Nn+1|Fn ) is an implicit condition. The following two results are fundamental
in establishing a relation between the measure-theoretic and the game-theoretic framework.
Proposition 22 (Lévy’s zero-one law; [1, Theorem VII.4.3]). For any filtered probability space (Y ,F ,{Fn}n∈N0 ,P)
and any P-integrable function f , we have that
lim
n→+∞
E( f |Fn ) = E( f |F∞) P-almost surely
Proposition 23 (Ville’s theorem; [3, Proposition 8.14]). For any filtered probability space (Y ,F ,{Fn}n∈N0 ,P) and
any A ∈ F∞, we have that P(A) = 0 if and only if there is a non-negative measure-theoretic martingale that con-
verges to +∞ on A.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 10
Proposition 10 will be shown to hold by establishing the equivalence between the global measure-theoretic
and global game-theoretic (upper) expectation on a particular restricted domain and then applying Theorem 6.
Before we relate both globalmodels, however, we first establish the following alternative characterisation for the
unique extension Q↑
s
of the local linear (upper) expectation Qs corresponding to any probability mass function
ps onX :
Lemma 24. Consider anyprobabilitymass functionps onX and let Qs be the unique linear expectation onL (X )
corresponding to ps . Then we have thatQ
↑
s
( f ) =
∑
x∈X f (x )ps (x ) for all f ∈L (X ).
Proof. Let Es :L (X )→ R be defined by Es ( f ) :=
∑
x∈X f (x )ps (x ) for all f ∈ L (X ). We show that Q
↑
s
coincides
with Es . It is clear that this is the case on the domainL (X ) of all gambles onX ; this follows immediately from
the fact that Q ↑
s
is an extension of Qs together with the fact that Es ( f ) =
∑
x∈X f (x )ps (x ) =Qs ( f ) for all f ∈L (X ).
To see that both coincide onL b(X ), consider any f ∈L b(X ) and observe that
Q ↑
s
( f )
C8
= lim
c→+∞
Q↑
s
( f ∧c ) = lim
c→+∞
∑
x∈X
f ∧c (x )ps (x ) =
∑
x∈X
lim
c→+∞
f ∧c (x )ps (x ) =
∑
x∈X
ps (x ) lim
c→+∞
f ∧c (x )
=
∑
x∈X
ps (x ) f (x ) = Es ( f ),
where the second equality follows from the fact that f ∧c ∈ L (X ) for any c ∈ R and, as we have just shown, Q↑
s
and Es coincide onL (X ); where the third equality follows from the fact thatX is finite and that, for all x ∈X ,
f ∧c (x )ps (x ) is real and non-decreasing in c ; where the fourth equality follows from the fact that ps (x )≥ 0 for all
x ∈ X and our convention that 0 · (+∞) = 0; and where the last equality follows from the definition of Es . In
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an analogous way, we show that Q↑
s
and Es coincide on their entire domainL (X ): consider any f ∈L (X ) and
note that
Q ↑
s
( f )
C9
= lim
c→−∞
Q↑
s
( f ∨c ) = lim
c→−∞
∑
x∈X
f ∨c (x )ps (x ) =
∑
x∈X
lim
c→−∞
f ∨c (x )ps (x ) =
∑
x∈X
ps (x ) lim
c→−∞
f ∨c (x )
=
∑
x∈X
ps (x ) f (x ) = Es ( f ),
where the second equality follows from the fact that f ∨c ∈L b(X ) for any c ∈R and, as we have just shown, Q
↑
s
and Es coincide onL b(X ); where the third equality follows from the fact thatX is finite, our convention that
+∞−∞ = −∞+∞ = +∞ and that, for all x ∈ X , f ∨c (x )ps (x ) is in R∪ {+∞} and non-decreasing in c ; the
fourth equality follows from the fact that ps (x ) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and our convention that 0 · (−∞) = 0; and the
last equality follows from the definition of Es .
Henceforth, for any precise probability tree p and any s ∈X ∗, we will always let Q↑
s
be this unique extension
of the linear expectation Qs corresponding to the probability mass function p (·|s ). We will then say that a map
M :X ∗ → R is a game-theoretic supermartingale with respect to a precise probability tree p if M is a game-
theoretic supermartingale with respect to the local upper expectations Q ↑
s
.
Furthermore, for any precise probability tree p : s ∈X ∗ 7→ p (·|s ), we let P :F ×X ∗→R be the corresponding
conditional probability measure as discussed in Section 9, where F is the σ-algebra generated by all cylinder
events. Recall that, for any s ∈ X ∗, the map P(·|s ) = P|s is then a probability measure on F . This allows us to
apply the concepts and results inAppendix Ahere, by considering theprobability space (Ω,F ,P|s ), for any s ∈X ∗.
For notational convenience, we will let E|s ( f ) be the Lebesgue integral
∫
Ω
f dP|s with respect to the measure
P|s for all F -measurable f ∈ V and all s ∈ X
∗ such that
∫
Ω
f dP|s exists. So E|s ( f ) is an alternative notation
for Emeas,p ( f |s ). We introduce this notation because it allows us to write E|s ( f |G ) to denote a G -measurable
function representing the measure-theoretic expectation of f conditional on a σ-algebra G ⊆ F , as defined
in Appendix A. Furthermore, we equip the measurable space (Ω,F ) with the filtration {Fn }n∈N0 where, for any
n ∈N0,Fn is theσ-algebra generated by all cylinder events Γ (x1:n )where x1:n ∈X
n . Note that, for any n ∈N0, an
Fn -measurable function is then an n-measurable variable because the cylinder events Γ (x1:n ) form the atoms
of Fn and X is finite. Hence, any measure-theoretic process {Nn}n∈N0 in (Ω,F ,{Fn}n∈N0 ) is a sequence of n-
measurable variables. This allows us to writeNn (x1:n ) for any n ∈ N0 and any x1:n ∈ X
n to mean the constant
value ofNn on allω∈ Γ (x1:n ).
Lemma 25. Consider any x1:n ∈ X
∗, any precise probability tree p and let P be the corresponding conditional
probabilitymeasure. Then, for any non-negativemeasure-theoretic martingale {Ni }i∈N0 in the filtered probability
space (Ω,F ,{Fm}m∈N0 ,P|x1:n ), there is a non-negative game-theoretic (super)martingale
11 M with respect to the
tree p such that liminfM ≥x1:n liminfi→+∞Ni and moreoverM (x1:n ) =N0().
Proof. Fix any non-negative measure-theoretic martingale {Ni }i∈N0 and letM :X
∗→R be defined by
M (z1:m ) :=


Nm (z1:m ) if n ≤m , z1:n = x1:n and P|x1:n (z1:m )> 0;
+∞ if n ≤m , z1:n = x1:n and P|x1:n (z1:m ) = 0;
Nn (x1:n ) otherwise,
for all z1:m ∈X
∗.
We show thatM is anon-negative game-theoretic supermartingale such thatM (x1:n ) =N0() and liminfM ≥x1:n
liminfi→+∞Ni .
Let us first show thatM (z1:m ) ≥ Q
↑
z1:m
(M (z1:m ·)) for all z1:m ∈ X
∗ and therefore, thatM is a game-theoretic
supermartingale. Recall that, because {Ni }i∈N0 is a non-negative measure-theoretic martingale, we have that
11As shown in the proof, the inequalityM (z1:m )≥Q
↑
z1:m
(M (z1:m ·)) is actually an equality, for all z1:m ∈X
∗. Combining this with the non-
negativity ofM and the characterisation of the upper expectations Q ↑z1:m that we established in Lemma 24, it can then be deduced that−M
is also a game-theoretic supermartingale. In this case, we can therefore actually callM a game-theoretic martingale.
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{Ni }i∈N0 is a sequence of non-negative real i -measurable variables such that E|x1:n (Ni+1|Fi ) = Ni P|x1:n -almost
surely for all i ∈N0 (note that the considered expectations exist because {Ni }i∈N0 is non-negative). For all i ∈N0
and all A ∈Fi , since E|x1:n (Ni+1|Fi ) andNi only differ on a P|x1:n -null set, we have that
∫
A
E|x1:n (Ni+1|Fi )dP|x1:n =∫
A
NidP|x1:n because of M3. In particular, this implies that∫
Γ (z1:m )
E|x1:n (Nm+1|Fm )dP|x1:n =
∫
Γ (z1:m )
NmdP|x1:n for anym ∈N0 and any z1:m ∈X
m .
Moreover, since Γ (z1:m ) ∈ Fm , it follows from the definition of the measure-theoretic conditional expectation
that
∫
Γ (z1:m )
Nm+1dP|x1:n =
∫
Γ (z1:m )
E|x1:n (Nm+1|Fm )dP|x1:n . Combining both equalities, we find that∫
Γ (z1:m )
Nm+1dP|x1:n =
∫
Γ (z1:m )
NmdP|x1:n =Nm (z1:m )
∫
Γ (z1:m )
dP|x1:n =Nm (z1:m )P|x1:n (z1:m ),
where the second equality follows fromM1and the fact thatNm is constant and real on the cylinder event Γ (z1:m ).
Moreover, becauseNm+1 is (m + 1)-measurable and real-valued, the term on the left hand side of the equation
above reduces to the finite sum
∑
zm+1∈X
Nm+1(z1:m+1)P|x1:n (z1:m+1), allowing us to conclude that
Nm (z1:m )P|x1:n (z1:m ) =
∑
zm+1∈X
Nm+1(z1:m+1)P|x1:n (z1:m+1) for anym ∈N0 and any z1:m ∈X
m . (B.1)
Consider now first anym ≥ n and any z1:m ∈Xm such that z1:n = x1:n and P|x1:n (z1:m )> 0. It then follows from
the definition ofM that
M (z1:m )P|x1:n (z1:m ) =Nm (z1:m )P|x1:n (z1:m )
(B.1)
=
∑
zm+1∈X
Nm+1(z1:m+1)P|x1:n (z1:m+1)
=
∑
zm+1∈X
M (z1:m+1)P|x1:n (z1:m+1)
=
∑
zm+1∈X
M (z1:m+1)P|x1:n (z1:m )p (zm+1|z1:m )
= P|x1:n (z1:m )
∑
zm+1∈X
M (z1:m+1)p (zm+1|z1:m ) = P|x1:n (z1:m )Q
↑
z1:m
(M (z1:m ·)),
where the third equality followsbecauseNm+1(z1:m+1)onlydiffers fromM (z1:m+1) if P|x1:n (z1:m+1) = 0 [becausen ≤
m + 1 and z1:n = x1:n ] and our convention that 0 · (+∞) = 0, where the fourth equality follows from Equation (6)
together with the fact that n < m + 1 and z1:n = x1:n , and where the last equality follows from the expression
for Q ↑
z1:m
that we established in Lemma 24. Recall that P|x1:n (z1:m ) > 0, so we can devide both sides by P|x1:n (z1:m )
to obtain that M (z1:m ) = Q
↑
z1:m
(M (z1:m ·)). As a consequence, the condition that M (z1:m ) ≥ Qz1:m (M (z1:m ·)) is
satisfied for all z1:m ∈X ∗ such thatm ≥ n , z1:n = x1:n and P|x1:n (z1:m )> 0.
Second, consider any z1:m ∈ X
∗ such that m ≥ n , z1:n = x1:n and P|x1:n (z1:m ) = 0. Then we also have that
P|x1:n (z1:m+1) = 0 for any zm+1 ∈X because Γ (z1:m+1) ⊂ Γ (z1:m ), and it therefore follows from the definition ofM
thatM (z1:m ) =M (z1:m+1) = +∞ for all zm+1 ∈X . Hence, using Lemma 24, we find that
Q↑
z1:m
(M (z1:m ·)) =
∑
zm+1∈X
M (z1:m+1)p (zm+1|z1:m ) = +∞=M (z1:m ),
which establishes that indeed M (z1:m ) ≥ Q
↑
z1:m
(M (z1:m ·)). So we have that M (z1:m ) ≥ Q
↑
z1:m
(M (z1:m ·)) for all
z1:m ∈X
∗ such thatm ≥ n and z1:n = x1:n .
Thirdly, consider any other situation z1:m ∈X
∗. That is, consider any z1:m ∈X
∗ such thatn >m or z1:n 6= x1:n .
It then follows from the definition ofM thatM (z1:m ) =Nn (x1:n ) and, as wewill now show, that alsoM (z1:m+1) =
Nn (x1:n ) for all zm+1 ∈ X . Our assumption about z1:m tells us that there are two cases: either n ≤m and z1:n 6=
x1:n , either n >m . If n ≤m and z1:n 6= x1:n , then also n ≤m + 1 and therefore, due to the definition ofM , we
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find thatM (z1:m+1) =Nn (x1:n ) for all zm+1 ∈ X . If n >m , then either n >m + 1 or n =m + 1. If n >m + 1 or,
equivalently, n 6≤ m + 1, then it is once more clear from the definition ofM thatM (z1:m+1) = Nn (x1:n ) for all
zm+1 ∈ X . If n = m + 1, then for any zm+1 ∈ X , we either have that z1:m+1 = x1:n or that z1:m+1 6= x1:n . In the
latter case, it is clear, again due to the definition ofM , thatM (z1:m+1) =Nn (x1:n ). Otherwise, so if z1:m+1 = x1:n ,
the definition ofM also implies thatM (z1:m+1) =M (x1:n ) = Nn (x1:n ) because P|x1:n (x1:n ) = 1 > 0 according to
Equation (6). We conclude that, indeed, M (z1:m ) = Nn (x1:n ) and M (z1:m+1) = Nn (x1:n ) for all zm+1 ∈ X . It
now follows trivially from Lemma 24 that M (z1:m ) = Q
↑
z1:m
(M (z1:m ·)), and therefore definitely that M (z1:m ) ≥
Q↑
z1:m
(M (z1:m ·)).
So we have proved thatM (z1:m ) ≥Q
↑
z1:m
(M (z1:m ·)) for all z1:m ∈X
∗ and therefore, thatM is indeed a game-
theoretic supermartingale with respect to the tree p . Moreover, M is non-negative because {Ni }i∈N0 is non-
negative. That liminfi→+∞M (ω
i ) ≥ liminfi→+∞Ni (ω) holds for all ω ∈ Γ (x1:n ), follows immediately from the
fact thatM (ωi ) ≥ Ni (ωi ) =Ni (ω) for any ω ∈ Γ (x1:n ) and any i ≥ n , where the inequality is simply implied by
the definition ofM together with the fact thatωn = x1:n and i ≥ n . It still remains to show thatM (x1:n ) =N0().
We only need to prove thatN0() =Nn (x1:n ), since the desired equality then trivially follows from the defin-
ition ofM and the fact that P|x1:n (x1:n ) = 1 > 0 due to Equation (6). To do so, consider any z1:m ∈ X
∗ such that
m < n and z1:m = x1:m . Note that, by Equation (6), we then have that P|x1:n (z1:m ) = 1. Moreover, it should also be
clear from Equation (6) that P|x1:n (z1:m+1) = 1 if zm+1 = xm+1 [because then z1:m+1 = x1:m+1 and m + 1 ≤ n ] and
that P|x1:n (z1:m+1) = 0 otherwise [because then z1:m+1 6= x1:m+1]. Hence, plugging this back into (B.1), we find that
Nm (z1:m ) =Nm+1(z1:m xm+1). Since this holds for any z1:m ∈ X
∗ such thatm < n and z1:m = x1:m , it follows that
Nm (x1:m ) =Nm+1(x1:m+1) for allm < n . This clearly implies thatN0() =N1(x1) = · · ·=Nn (x1:n ).
In the following proof, we will write, for any two f ,g ∈ V, any s ∈ X ∗ and any (unconditional) probability
measure P′ onF , that f =s g P-almost surely—and similarly for≥s and≤s—if the event {ω ∈ Γ (s ) : f (ω) 6= g (ω)}
is P-null. Note that then f =s g P-almost surely if f = g P-almost surely.
Proof of Proposition 10. Fix anyF -measurable f ′ ∈V andany x1:n ∈X
∗. It suffices to show thatEmeas,p ( f
′|x1:n ) =
EV( f ′|x1:n ); the desired equality is then automatically implied by Theorem 6. First observe that, because f ′ is
bounded andF -measurable, Emeas,p ( f
′|x1:n ) = E|x1:n ( f
′) exists. Wewill nowprove that Emeas,p ( f |x1:n ) = EV( f |x1:n )
for the non-negative F -measurable gamble f := f ′ − inf f ′ (the variable f is indeed a gamble because f ′ is a
gamble and therefore inf f ′ ∈R), which then implies that Emeas,p ( f ′|x1:n ) = EV( f ′|x1:n ) because Emeas,p (·|x1:n ) and
EV both satisfy the constant additivity property; see M1 and V4.
We first show that EV( f |x1:n )≤ Emeas,p ( f |x1:n ). To do so, we will prove that there is some c ∈R such that, for
all ε > 0, there is a bounded below game-theoretic supermartingaleM ε with respect to the tree p such that
M ε(x1:n ) = Emeas,p ( f |x1:n ) + εc and liminfM ε ≥x1:n f . Indeed, the desired inequality then follows immediately
from the definition of EV .
Consider the filtered probability space (Ω,F ,{Fm}m∈N0 ,P|x1:n ) and the corresponding measure-theoretic ex-
pectation E|x1:n= Emeas,p (·|x1:n ). Since f is bounded andF -measurable, it is surely P|x1:n-integrable (the Lebesgue
integral of a bounded F -measurable function is real-valued), and therefore, by Proposition 22 in Appendix A,
we have that
lim
m→+∞
E|x1:n ( f |Fm ) = E|x1:n ( f |F∞) P|x1:n-almost surely.
Note thatF∞ =σ(∪m∈N0Fm ) =F is the smallest σ-algebra generated by all cylinder events, which, by M4, im-
plies that E|x1:n ( f |F∞) = f , P|x1:n -almost surely. Hence, since the intersection of two P|x1:n-almost sure events is
itself also P|x1:n-almost sure, we have that limm→+∞E|x1:n ( f |Fm ) = f P|x1:n-almost surely. Moreover, note that the
conditional expectations E|x1:n ( f |Fm ) can be chosen in such away that the sequence {E|x1:n ( f |Fm )}m∈N0 is a non-
negative measure-theoretic martingale in the filtered probability space (Ω,F ,{Fm}m∈N0 ,P|x1:n ). Indeed, each
E|x1:n ( f |Fm ) is real-valued and non-negative P|x1:n-almost surely because of M7 and the fact that f is bounded
and non-negative. So, since the value of the measure-theoretic conditional expectation can be chosen arbitrar-
ily on a null set, E|x1:n ( f |Fm ) can be chosen such that it is real-valued and non-negative everywhere. Moreover,
because of M6, we have that E|x1:n
 
E|x1:n ( f |Fm+1)|Fm

= E|x1:n ( f |Fm ) P|x1:n-almost surely for all m ∈ N0, where
E|x1:n
 
E|x1:n ( f |Fm+1)|Fm

exists becauseE|x1:n ( f |Fm+1) isF -measurable andnon-negative. So let {E|x1:n ( f |Fm )}m∈N0
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be a version of the conditional expectations that forms a non-negative measure-theoretic martingale. We can
then use Lemma 25 to infer the existence of a non-negative game-theoretic supermartingaleM 0 with respect
to the tree p such that liminfM 0 ≥x1:n liminfm→+∞E|x1:n ( f |Fm ) andM 0(x1:n ) = E|x1:n ( f |F0)(). Then, because
limm→+∞E|x1:n ( f |Fm ) = f P|x1:n-almost surely and therefore also limm→+∞E|x1:n ( f |Fm ) =x1:n f P|x1:n-almost surely,
we have that liminfM 0 ≥x1:n f P|x1:n-almost surely. Moreover, we have thatM 0(x1:n ) = E|x1:n ( f |F0)() = E|x1:n ( f ),
due to the fact thatF0 = {;,Ω} and property M5. So, we can conclude thatM 0 is a non-negative game-theoretic
supermartingale with respect to p such thatM 0(x1:n ) = E|x1:n ( f ) = Emeas,p ( f |x1:n ) and liminfM 0 ≥x1:n f P|x1:n -
almost surely.
As our final step towards obtainingM ε, consider Proposition 23 and note that it ensures that there is a non-
negative measure-theoretic supermartingale {Nm}m∈N0 in (Ω,F ,{Fm}m∈N0 ,P|x1:n ) that converges to +∞ on all
paths ω ∈ Γ (x1:n ) such that liminfM 0(ω) < f (ω). Indeed, the set of all such paths ω has probability zero be-
cause liminfM 0 ≥x1:n f P|x1:n -almost surely. Let c :=N0(), which is real-valued because {Nm}m∈N0 is a measure-
theoretic supermartingale. By Lemma 25, we find that there is a non-negative game-theoretic supermartingale
M ′ with respect to p such that liminfM ′ ≥x1:n liminfm→+∞Nm andM
′(x1:n ) =N0() = c . Since {Nm}m∈N0 con-
verges to +∞ on all paths ω ∈ Γ (x1:n ) such that liminfM 0(ω) < f (ω), it follows thatM ′ also converges to +∞
on all such pathsω. Consider now any ε > 0 and letM ε be the process defined byM ε(s ) :=M 0(s )+εM
′(s ) for
all s ∈X ∗. ThenM ε is clearly non-negative—and therefore bounded below—and it is a game-theoretic super-
martingale because of [16, Lemma 12].12 Furthermore, note that liminfM ε(ω)≥ f (ω) for allω ∈ Γ (x1:n ). Indeed,
if liminfM 0(ω)≥ f (ω) for someω∈ Γ (x1:n ), then also liminfM ε(ω)≥ f (ω) because ε andM
′ are non-negative.
If liminfM 0(ω) < f (ω) for some ω ∈ Γ (x1:n ), thenM ′, and therefore also εM ′, converges to +∞, which, to-
gether with the non-negativity ofM 0, implies thatM ε converges to+∞ onω. Hence, also in this case, we have
that liminfM ε(ω)≥ f (ω) so we can conclude that liminfM ε ≥x1:n f . Moreover, recall thatM
′(x1:n ) = c ∈R and
thatM 0(x1:n ) = E|x1:n ( f ), so we have thatM ε(x1:n ) =M 0(x1:n ) + εM
′(x1:n ) = E|x1:n ( f ) + εc = Emeas,p ( f |x1:n ) + εc .
Hence,M ε satisfies all the desired conditions and we conclude that indeed EV( f |x1:n )≤ Emeas,p ( f |x1:n ).
Then we are left to show the remaining inequality EV( f |x1:n ) ≥ Emeas,p ( f |x1:n ). However, this can be easily
deduced from the already obtained inequality and the self-conjugacyof Emeas,p . Indeed, E|x1:n (− f ) exists because
− f is F -measurable and bounded, so we can apply M1 to find that Emeas,p ( f |x1:n ) = E|x1:n ( f ) = −E|x1:n (− f ) =
−Emeas,p (− f |x1:n ). Since we have already shown that EV (g |x1:n )≤ Emeas,p (g |x1:n ) for allF -measurable g ∈V, we
have in particular that EV(− f |x1:n )≤ Emeas,p (− f |x1:n ), which implies that Emeas,p ( f |x1:n ) = −Emeas,p (− f |x1:n ) ≤
−EV(− f |x1:n ) = EV ( f |x1:n ) ≤ EV( f |x1:n ), where the last inequality follows from V1 and the fact that EA = EV—and
therefore also EA= EV—because of Theorem 6.
12Alternatively, instead of using [16, Lemma 12], one could also easily deduce this using the alternative expression for the local models Q ↑s
that we established in Lemma 24.
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